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ABSTRACT

Getting the Benefit of the Doubt:
The Effect of Randomization Ratio on the Placebo Response
by
Taiki Matsuura

Advisor: Cynthia Calkins, Ph.D.

Placebos are commonly employed in clinical trials as inactive treatments to which
experimental treatments are compared against in order to control for psychological
“noise.” Randomized double-blind placebo control studies are considered the “gold
standard” in epidemiologic research because they can provide the strongest possible
evidence of causation if designed correctly (Hulley, Cummings, Browner, & Grady,
2007). One phenomenon that poses a threat to the integrity of this evidence is the placebo
response (PR), or referred to as the “placebo effect.” Expectancy is considered a central
PR mechanism and boasts the most empirical support among all proposed mechanisms.
Expectancy is not limited to treatment efficacy. Experimental variables also affect
expectancy and subsequent PR. Unlike standard clinical care, there is no guarantee that
subjects in a randomized placebo control trial will receive experimental treatment. This
uncertainty affects expectancy and subsequent PR. The randomization ratio (RR)
represents the distribution of subjects across conditions and thus the probability of
receiving either experimental or placebo treatment. The RR of 1:1 (50-50 chance of being
iv

randomized to experimental or placebo condition; maximum uncertainty) has long been
considered the norm, but an increasing number of trials have begun employing
unbalanced RR. Studies generally agree that larger allocation to experimental treatment
(and smaller allocation to placebo) results in increased PR. However, there are many
limitations in the literature that make reaching this conclusion tentative. Objectives: The
purpose of the current study was to determine whether RR affects the PR. Methods: The
experiment included eight groups with varying randomized ratios and employed a
performance-based measure that was successfully enhanced by a placebo treatment.
Conclusion: The results of this study provides support for the theory that there exists a
relationship between the randomization ratio and the magnitude of the placebo response.
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Definitions
Placebo Response/Effect (PR): The placebo response has been defined as “measurable
psychological, biological, and behavioral changes that result from expectations that a
treatment will be effective” (Colloca, Jonas, Killen, Miller & Shurtleff, 2014; Geers et
al., 2018, pg 4). Although there are some subtle differences between the terms, “placebo
effect” and “placebo response” (PR), they will be used interchangeably in this study.

Randomization/Allocation Ratio (RR): Randomization ratio refers to the ratio that
represents the distribution/allocation of subjects across conditions. In the current study,
there were eight levels of randomization ratio: 100:0, 90:10, 75:25, 50:50, 25:75, 10:90,
Open Placebo (OP), and No-Treatment (NT).

Open-Chance Groups: The five groups that were informed that they could receive either
active or placebo treatments (i.e., 90:10, 75:25, 50:50, 25:75, 10:90) were referred to as
"open-chance" groups.

Grammatical Reasoning Test (GRT): The Grammatical Reasoning Test is a 64-item
test based on Baddeley's (1968) grammatical reasoning test with visual elements added to
accommodate the placebo paradigm central to the current study.

GRT Score: The total number of items correct was used as the GRT score as was the
case in past studies (Baddeley, A.D. 1968; Carter, Kennedy, Bittner, Jr., 1981).

xiii

GRT Items Attempted: The total number of items attempted, regardless of whether the
answer was correct/incorrect.
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Getting the Benefit of the Doubt
GETTING THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT:
THE EFFECT OF RANDOMIZATION RATIO ON THE PLACEBO RESPONSE
Chapter I: Introduction
A randomized controlled trial (RCT) is a type of experiment designed to reduce
bias (Chalmers et al., 1981). In a RCT, subjects are typically randomly assigned to two or
more conditions or “arms” consisting of at least one experimental condition (with
treatment to be evaluated) and at least one control condition. RCTs are considered the
“gold standard” in epidemiologic research because they can provide the strongest
possible evidence of causation if designed correctly (Hulley, Cummings, Browner, Grady
& Newman, 2007). Control conditions employed in RCTs typically consist of a notreatment control condition, placebo control condition, and/or positive control condition.
In all cases, the treatment evaluated must establish that it is demonstrably better than the
control condition(s) employed. As such, in placebo-controlled trials, the treatment
evaluated must establish that it is demonstrably better than a placebo to be considered
efficacious. Placebos are inert treatments to which active treatments can be compared
against to control for changes associated with the belief that one is receiving treatment.
However, what was originally intended to be inert and produce no effect has been shown
to do much more. This phenomenon that complicates the experimental-placebo
comparison is what is commonly referred to as the “placebo effect.”
The placebo effect has been defined as consisting of “measurable psychological,
biological, and behavioral changes that result from expectations that a treatment will be
effective” (Colloca, Jonas, Killen, Miller & Shurtleff, 2014, p. 124). The effect stems
from the interaction between external contexts (i.e. cues from the environment, provider
interactions, verbal or nonverbal suggestions) and internal contexts (i.e. the expectations,
1
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previous associations, learned responses, and memories) (Burke, Kaptchuk, & PascualLeone, 2019, p. 12). Historically rendered a confounding nuisance variable in research
(Faria, Fredrikson, & Furmark, 2008) and dismissed as simply subjective bias in clinical
settings, the placebo effect gradually began drawing attention more for its desirable
properties. Over time, placebo responses have come to be reconceptualized as
meaningful, scientifically quantifiable, complex psychobiological changes brought on by
treatment expectations (Geers & Miller, 2014). Many researchers today regard the
placebo effect as an inevitable component of research and a crucial component in
healthcare and have begun searching for reliable techniques to harness its potential and
enhance its benefits (e.g., Alves, Lopes & Hernandez, 2017; Bishop et al., 2017; Geers,
Brinol, Vogel, Aspiras, Caplandies, & Petty, 2018; Kaptchuk et al., 2010; Rief et al.,
2017). No longer confined to aspects of healthcare, the interest in this phenomenon has
broadened to areas of academic and cognitive performance, social well-being, consumer
marketing (Alves et al., 2017; Geers et al., 2018; Tuchina, Agibalova, Shustov, Shustova,
Buzik, & Petrosyan, 2018; Yan, Yong, Huang & Ma, 2018), sports performance (Hurst et
al., 2019), and many others. The ubiquity of the placebo effect and generalizability of its
principles makes it a useful framework through which to organize and relate common
behavioral concepts across various disciplines.
It has been well established that expectancy plays a central role in the PR
(Benedetti, 2014; Colloca, Klinger, Flor, & Bingel, 2013; Geers et al., 2018; Kirsch,
1997; Ross and Olson, 1981; Rutherford et al., 2009; Spiro, 1986; Stewart-Williams &
Podd, 2004; Vase, Riley, & Price, 2002). Expectations have been hypothesized to bring
about placebo effects by: (1) producing behavioral changes, (2) influencing emotions,
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and (3) serving as the lens or framework through which subsequent experiences and
events are interpreted, often in a confirmatory manner (Ashar, Chang, & Wager, 2017;
Geers et al., 2018; Kirsch, 1999). Expectancy is not limited to treatment efficacy and can
extend to other experimental variables. Trivedi and Rush (1994) speculated that subject
expectations might be moderated by their understanding of the research design, which in
turn influences their response to treatment. While most research to date have focused on
factors that affect expectations regarding the efficacy of active treatment, few have
expanded their focus to include factors that affect expectations regarding the likelihood of
actually receiving active treatment. One fundamental component inherent to all
randomized placebo-controlled trials that affects such expectancy—the randomization
ratio (RR)—has been largely unstudied.
The RR represents the distribution of subjects across conditions. Unlike patients
in standard clinical care, subjects in randomized placebo-controlled trials are not
guaranteed active treatment. For example, in a basic two-arm placebo-controlled trial,
subjects are randomized to either the experimental or placebo condition. In such a trial,
the RR is 1:1. Subjects are either instructed explicitly or provided with sufficient
information to conclude that they have an equal “fifty-fifty” chance of receiving an active
treatment or placebo. This knowledge leads to uncertainty, affecting a subject’s
expectancy of treatment and thereby the PR (Colagiuri, 2010). For this reason,
researchers have hypothesized that placebo effects observed in clinical trials are subdued
because subjects are constantly aware that they may or may not be receiving an active
treatment. They argue that the effects would be more powerful in standard clinical care
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because subjects are more likely to be convinced that they are indeed receiving active
treatment (Vase, Riley, & Price, 2002).
Although there are some subtle differences, the terms, placebo effect and placebo
response (PR) will be used often interchangeably in this study. The term active will be
used to refer to the positive control and experimental conditions will also be used
interchangeably to refer to all conditions that are not the placebo group.

1.1 Statement of the Problem
In terms of placebo-controlled trials, a balanced randomization ratio (RR) is one
in which an equal distribution of subjects is to be assigned to active and placebo
conditions. An unbalanced RR is one in which an unequal distribution of subjects is to be
assigned to active and placebo conditions, and has been defined simply as “any deviation
from a 1:1 randomisation schedule” (Weimer, Colloca, Enck, 2015, p. 251). For example,
in a two-arm unbalanced design where 200 subjects are to be assigned to the active
condition and 100 subjects are to be assigned to the placebo condition, the RR is 2:1. Of
note, to this author’s knowledge, there does not appear to exist a standard convention on
how RR is to be reported. For example, some researchers report the active proportion for
the “numerator” (first number) and placebo proportion for the “denominator” (second
number), while others do the reverse. Additionally, some researchers appear to prefer to
separate the RR by each condition rather than overall sample sizes for experimental
versus placebo conditions. For example, a 2:1 study in which there are two experimental
and one placebo conditions could be reported as 1:1:1.
Traditionally, the balanced RR of 1:1 (50-50 chance of being randomized to
experimental or placebo condition) has been considered the standard. Recently, however,
4
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the number of trials employing unbalanced RR has been on the rise (Broderick, et al.,
2013; Hawker et al., 2009; Hey & Kimmelman, 2014). Choice of RR is not always at the
sole discretion of the researchers, as IRBs and ethics committees have been known to
influence the decision (Diener, Dowson, Ferrari, Nappi & Tfelt-Hansen., 1999). The
rationale for such studies may include: (1) conservation of resources and speed trials by
adding more treatment arms, and (2) aspirations to follow the clinical research ethics
code that requires minimizing the total burden on study subjects, interpreted by many as
assigning as few subjects as possible to placebo conditions. However, these proposed
benefits have been questioned given that (1) unequal allocation requires larger sample
sizes to achieve the same level of statistical power, (2) lack of evidence to support the
assumption that uneven randomization accelerates recruitment, and (3) the assumption
that patients in the active condition will be better off than those in the placebo condition,
even though the purpose of the trial is to make that determination (Hey & Kimmelman,
2014). Furthermore, a cost-benefit analysis found that recruitment speed would need to
increase by approximately 50% to offer any appreciable cost reduction or expedite study
completion to justify the use of unequal allocation (Vozdolska, Sano, Aisen, & Edland,
2009). Nonetheless, some researchers have continued to advocate for increasing use of
unbalanced trials to evaluate a greater number of experimental treatments at one time
(Dumville, Hahn, Miles, Torgerson, 2006; Parmar, Carpenter, & Sydes, 2014). However,
such recommendations appear to dismiss the potential for placebo effects and should be
approached with caution, especially in light of limited understanding of this complex
phenomenon. There is already rising concerns regarding the validity of many metaanalyses to date that have not taken into account these ratios, contrasting treatment arms
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versus the same placebo condition without adjusting for the likelihood of active treatment
(Mallinckrodt, Tamura, & Tanaka, 2011).
Reasons notwithstanding, when participants are explicitly informed of the
randomization ratios, unbalanced studies can produce unexpected and inconsistent
results. It has been hypothesized that the lower odds of being assigned to the placebo
condition, which typically implies a higher probability of receiving active treatment,
increases expectations of symptom change and results in greater response to both active
and placebo treatments (Weimer, Colloca, & Enck, 2015). However, since placebo
treatments benefit more from this uncertainty than active treatments, the result is a
smaller active-placebo difference (Sinyor, Levitt, Cheung, Schaffer, Kiss, Dowlati, &
Lanctot, 2010). This can lead to efficacious experimental treatments falling short of
statistical significance. In short, in a placebo-controlled trial, an unbalanced RR may pose
a confound that can have significant impact on the outcome of a trial. Ultimately,
promising treatments may not appear to fare any better than placebo treatments.
Although this a legitimate concern in any trial in which a placebo effect is observed, the
risk may be greatly increased with unbalanced RR. Take for example, a case in which
researchers wish to determine the efficacy of two experimental treatments and choose to
conduct a single 1:1:1 trial rather than two separate 1:1 trials. The single three-arm trial is
not equivalent to two separate two-arm trials, however. The two 1:1 studies maintain the
optimal RR, whereas the 1:1:1 study produces a 2:1 chance of receiving experimental
treatment versus placebo. When subjects are made aware of this (often through
pamphlets, informed consent, etc.), some may recognize that their chances of receiving
an active treatment is twice that of receiving a placebo. This realization can lead to
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different expectations throughout the study than if subjects were enrolled in a typical 1:1
study, thereby affecting the PR in the study. In addition to affecting the magnitude of the
PR, the RR can also impact other aspects of a trial. An unbalanced RR can also influence
a subject’s perception of the trial and decision to participate. For example, studies with
unbalanced RRs skewed in favor of active conditions may be more likely to attract
participants who have a strong preference or need for active treatment than studies that
employ traditional 1:1 trials.
Studies have generally agreed that larger allocation to active treatment (and
smaller allocation to placebo) result in larger response to both active and placebo
treatments. However, there are many limitations in the literature that make reaching this
conclusion tentative at best. The purpose of the current study is to address many of the
limitations associated with previous studies and employ multiple levels of RR to
determine whether there is a relationship between RR and PR.

1.2 Limitations of the Literature
Lack of experiments. Although researchers appear to generally agree that the
randomization ratio (RR) affects placebo response (PR), there are many limitations in the
evidence that make reaching a conclusion tentative. Not only are there virtually no
studies that have directly investigated the RR-PR link, there have been notable
inconsistencies among the data that exists. In particular, one meta-analysis did not
support the hypothesis that RR affects PR rates (Loder, Goldstein, & Biondi, 2005), and
the only experiment that manipulated RRs found that 75% (3:1) had the greatest drugplacebo separation, albeit with a small sample of patients with Parkinson’s Disease
(Lidstone, Schulzer, Dinelle, Mak, Sossi, Ruth, et al., 2010). One study empirically
7
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manipulated the randomization ratio to determine power for varying RRs but did not
conduct an actual experiment and did not even take into consideration its effect on PR
(Leon & Solomon, 2010).
Mainly meta-analyses. Even most of the consistent RR-PR data have been
“pieced together” from unrelated studies, each with different designs, populations (e.g.,
migraine, Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), Parkinson’s disease, schizophrenia,
Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS), and ways in which participants were and were not
informed of the ratio/probabilities (Di Blasi, Kaptchuk, Weinman, & Kleijnen, 2002).
This is particularly important given the phenomenon of probability distortion, described
in prospect theory of behavioral economics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992), that demonstrated how the same probability or statistic presented in
slightly different ways can lead to dramatic changes in perceptions and conclusions.
No manipulation check. Notably, none of the studies described an inclusion of a
manipulation check to assess comprehension/encoding of the randomization ratio (RR) or
treatment assumption. Subjects may not have understood (or even paid attention to) the
RR presented. The assumption was that participants did. In fact, the only study that
randomly assigned participants to varying RR conditions was again Lidstone et al.
(2010), and recruitment was limited to a very specific population (patients with
Parkinson’s disease) that made it difficult to draw any general conclusions. Furthermore,
the study lacked power as there were only 35 subjects randomly assigned to one of four
groups (25% group, 50% group, 75% group, and 100% group), which implies that there
was roughly 8-9 subjects per condition. Similarly, none of the studies asked participants
for their treatment assumptions (which treatment they believed that they had received).
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Ultimately, what is of interest is not whether subjects understood/recalled the
randomization ratio (RR) but rather whether that affected their belief about the treatment
received and whether that had any impact on the placebo response (PR).
No open placebo condition. An open placebo (OP) condition is one in which
participants are informed that they are receiving a placebo. The theory underlying its use
is based on the possibility that even the knowledge of receiving a placebo may not
eliminate its effects. For instance, Park and Covi (1965) conducted a study where
participants received placebo pills along with counseling. 14 of the 15 participants
improved dramatically after a week despite being told outright that they were receiving
placebo pills. Almost all of the previous placebo studies did not include an open placebo
condition to rule out the possibility that the placebo treatment chosen to be inert is indeed
inert can actually improve performance.
The lack of validity checks. The lack of validity checks made it difficult to
differentiate between genuine difficulty with the task (GRT) and invalid responding (e.g.,
due to inattention and/or random responding). Validity checks were not implemented
during the GRT because of their disruptive potential to attention/focus (especailly on a
timed task). However, they could have been embedded into the pre-test and post-test
questions to identify broader patterns of invalid responding. Although random
assignment should have ensured equal distribution of such potentially invalid data, the
ability to identify and remove such data could have led to less noise and clearer results.
The lack of incentives. The lack of incentives may have decreased motivation.
However, simply providing increased opportunities for rewards (e.g. performance-based
incentives) may not have improved attention/validity and could have led to changes in

9

Getting the Benefit of the Doubt
counterintuitive ways. Leon Festinger (1957) showed that decreased rewards could lead
to dissonance reduction through effort justification. With the additional involvement of
randomization ratio elements in the current study, further examination may be warranted
before reaching any conclusions about the role of monetary incentives. Given that many
participants expressed curiosity about how they performed on the GRT following
completion of participation, adapting the study to score and prove their GRT score (and
informing them prior to participation that they could expect feedback) could have served
as a non-monetary incentive. However, it is also important to note that, beyond intuitive
assumptions, it has not yet been established that inattentiveness or lack of motivation has
any bearing on the placebo effect. That is, the placebo effect could still be seen in those
who were not fully attentive. Although choice of healthy population was deliberately
chosen for its strengths, healthy population can also be a limitation.

1.3 Research Questions
The current study addresses the following research questions:
1. Is there a relationship between the randomization ratio (RR) and the placebo
response (PR)?
2. Is there a relationship between the RR and test-taking speed?
3. Is there a relationship between the RR and assumption about the treatment
received (Treatment Assumption)?
4. Are Grammatical Reasoning Test (GRT) scores different based on the
assumption of the treatment received (Treatment Assumption)?
5. Which variables predict treatment assumption (active or placebo)?
6. Which variables predict GRT scores?
10
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7. Is there a relationship between randomization ratio (RR) and expectation of
and hope for efficacy?
8. Is there a relationship between expectation of and hope for efficacy and the
placebo response (PR)?

1.4 Statement of the Hypotheses
The following hypotheses are proposed, based on the existing literature:
1. Hypothesis 1 predicts that there will be a discernible relationship between the
randomization ratio (RR) and placebo response (PR), such that the
Grammatical Reasoning Test (GRT) scores will increase with the increasing
likelihood of receiving active treatment. This is based on the theorized role of
RR in the placebo response and on previous literature which suggests
that...”...patients' beliefs about the likelihood of placebo allocation are
associated with the magnitude of placebo response” (Diener, Dowson, Ferrari,
Nappi & Tfelt-Hansen, 1999; Kirsch &Weixel, 1988; Papakostas & Fava,
2009; Sinyor et al., 2010)
2. Hypothesis 2 predicts that there will be a discernible relationship between the
randomization ratio (RR) and the Grammatical Reasoning Test (GRT) items
attempted (i.e., test taking speed), such that GRT items attempted will
increase with the increasing likelihood of receiving active treatment.
3. Hypothesis 3 predicts that participants assigned to RR conditions with higher
likelihoods of receiving active treatment will be more likely to report an active
Treatment Assumption (TA) than participants assigned to RR conditions with
lower likelihoods. If the paradigm is successful in convincing participants of
11
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the purported study design, the Treatment Assumptions across groups should
follow a trend that reflects the assigned RRs.
4. Hypothesis 4 predicts that GRT scores will be significantly higher among
participants who report an active Treatment Assumption compared to those
who report a placebo treatment assumption. This is based on the theory on the
role of expectation in the placebo response (Rutherford et al., 2017).
5. Hypothesis 5 predicts that the RR group, Efficacy Expectation, Efficacy
Hope, and GRT score will significantly predict participants’ Treatment
Assumptions.
6. Hypothesis 6 predicts that after controlling for education, the RR group,
Efficacy Expectation, Treatment Assumption, and Efficacy Estimate will
significantly predict GRT scores.
7. Hypothesis 7 predicts that there will be a positive correlation between RR
(odds of receiving active treatment) and pre-test efficacy expectation and
efficacy hope for active treatment but not placebo.
8. Hypothesis 8 predicts that there will be a positive correlation between GRT
score and pre-test Efficacy Expectation and Efficacy Hope for active
treatment but not placebo.

12
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Chapter II: Review of the Literature
The aim of the review is to provide a history of the placebo effect and delineate
the main mechanisms and moderators identified as being involved in the phenomenon.
First, the chronicled history of the placebo effect is discussed, Second, theoretical
mechanisms of classical conditioning and expectancy are reviewed. Third,
internal/idiosyncratic placebogenic moderators, such as personality, neurobiological,
genetic, and sociocultural variables are discussed. Fourth, external/contextual
placebogenic moderators, such as environmental and interpersonal variables are
reviewed. Finally, experimental moderators are discussed. Experimental moderators
conceptually belong to the category of external/contextual moderators but was given its
own section because of its central focus in the proposed study.

2.1 History of the Placebo Effect
A placebo, translated from Latin means "I shall please" (Merriam-Webster’s
online dictionary, n.d.). Historically, funeral mourners for hire were referred to as
“placebos” (Lemoine, 2005) as they often sang a verse called Placebo Domino from the
Psalms chapter of the bible (deCraen, Kaputchuk, Tijssen, & Kleijnen, 1999).
In 1796, metal rods that claimed to cure people by removing the unhealthy fluid
from their bodies called the “Perkins tractor” was invented (Miller, 2003). Just three
years after its invention, a single blind experiment demonstrated that wooden rods
disguised to look like alloy rods were just as effective as the Perkins tractor (Haygarth,
1800). This early experiment alluded to the role of expectation in the placebo response.
Although the idea that our minds could affect our bodies has been around for
millenniums, it was in 1920 that T.C. Graves first coined the term “placebo effect”.
13
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Graves pointed out in a published article how placebo effects appeared to have led to
appreciable psychotherapeutic change in subjects (Graves, 1920).
Henry Beecher, who is sometimes erroneously credited for coining the term,
“placebo effect,” witnessed this phenomenon firsthand as a medic in World War II
(Lasagna, Von Felsinger, & Beecher, 1955). When the supply of morphine ran out, he
and others were forced to give wounded soldiers saline instead. He was shocked to find
that 40 percent of the wounded soldiers who received saline (and believing it was
morphine) reported that pain was reduced or eliminated altogether (Lasagna, Von
Felsinger, & Beecher, 1955). Beecher published a paper titled The Powerful Placebo, in
which he presented 15 case studies on pain and the results of those studies indicated that
placebo was effective in over 35% of them (Lemoine, 2005).
Prior to and since then, placebo treatments have been explored for various
ailments. They have been found to be effective for treating asthma (Kaptchuk et al.,
2008; Kemeny, Rosenwasser, Panettieri, Rose, Berg-Smith, & Kline, 2007), headaches
(Jellinek, 1946), migraines (de Craen, Tijssen, de Gans, & Kleijnen, 2000), severe postoperative pain (Keats & Beecher, 1950), depression (Leuchter, Cook, Witte, Morgan, &
Abrams, 2002), cancer-related fatigue (Gong, Sheng, Jin, He, Qi, Chen, et al., 2014),
anxiety disorders (Hofmann, Wu, Boettcher, & Sturm, 2014), nausea (Zhang, Wang,
Wang, & Xu, 2008), and a menagerie of other symptoms and illnesses (Shapiro &
Shapiro, 1997; Quitkin, 1999).
Not all placebos are equally effective, however. Some forms of placebos are more
effective for certain conditions and the concept that different placebos may give different
magnitude of placebo effects is referred to as “differential placebo effects” (Burke,
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Kaptchuk, & Pascual-Leone, 2019). For example, a recent meta-analysis found that
placebo surgery (also referred to as sham surgery, a surgical intervention in which the
critical element of the surgery is omitted (George et al., 2016) and sham acupuncture
were more effective for migraines than oral placebos (Meissner et al., 2013).
Wartolowska and colleagues (2014) conducted a systematic review of 53 trials and found
surgical interventions that used a placebo control had a 74% improvement in those in the
placebo group. Surgical placebos have received less attention, likely because of their
invasiveness, but have also been shown to be effective (Xiuxia, Yaolong, & Kehu, 2017).
There appears to be a hierarchy among the various administration methods. At
least in the United States, in general, injections work better than capsules, which work
better than pills (Grenfell, Briggs, & Holland, 1961). There is evidence to suggest that
patients may be affected by the presentation of a placebo pill, such as its color (de Craen,
Roos, de Vries & Kleijnen, 1996), size (Buckalew & Ross, 1981), stronger smells and
tastes (Buckalew & Coffield, 1982) and even its perceived value, where regularly priced
pills are more effective than discounted versions (Waber, Shiv, Carmon, & Ariely, 2008)
and brand names are more effective than generics (Branthwaite & Cooper, 1981). There
is also limited research that certain letters may enhance perceptions of drug efficacy.
Stepney (2010) found that pharmaceutical companies have been increasingly
incorporating more of the letters X and Z in their brand names. In terms of color, research
suggests that colored pills are superior to white pills for pain relief; blue pills are superior
to red for sleeping; and anxiety medications work best when they come in green capsules
(de Craen, Roos, de Vries & Kleijnen, 1996).
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Despite its name, placebos can also have undesirable effects, which are
commonly referred to as “nocebo effects”, which in latin means “I shall harm” (Kennedy,
1961). The distinction between placebos and nocebos appear artificial at best, based on
subjective desirability. In this paper, this distinction will not be made, and all will be
referred to as placebo. In addition to undesirable primary/intended effects, placebos can
lead to unexpected secondary/side effects (Vernia, Di Camillo, Foglietta, Avallone, & De
Carolis, 2010), such as withdrawal symptoms (Ockene et al., 2005). In one antidepressant
drug trial, a subject swallowed 29 placebo pills in an attempt to commit suicide. Though
the pills were harmless even in high doses, the participant’s blood pressure dropped to
dangerous levels. Once the subject was made aware of the pills’ ingredients, the adverse
symptoms quickly abated (Häuser, Hansen, & Enck, 2012).

2.2 Placebogenic Mechanisms
Classical conditioning and expectancy have been at the forefront of proposed
theoretical frameworks (e.g., Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004). These two theories have
often been seen as competitors (Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004), with some authors
finding in favor of classical conditioning (e.g., Bąbel et al., 2017; Colloca & Miller,
2011; Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004; Voudouris, Peck & Coleman, 1990) and others in
favor of expectancy theory (e.g., Benedetti, 2014; Colloca, Klinger, Flor, & Bingel, 2013;
Geers, Briñol, & Petty, 2018; Kirsch, 1997). The prevailing view, however, is that both
contribute significantly. In most cases, placebo effects are mediated by expectancies, and
conditioning is just one means by which expectancies are initially formed and
subsequently activated (Kirsch, 1985; Kirsch, 2004; Shiv et al., 2005; Stewart-Williams
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& Podd, 2004, Tolman, 1932). After all, our experiences and the resulting associations
shape our expectancies, and our expectancies often contribute to what we experience.
2.2.1 Classical conditioning. A placebo can acquire strength through classical
conditioning. Pavlov (1904) found that by repeatedly pairing a neutral stimulus (bell)
with an unconditioned stimulus (food), the neutral stimulus would eventually become
sufficient to evoke the unconditioned response (salivation) (Rescorla, 1988). Once
conditioning occurs, the neutral stimulus (bell) and unconditioned response (salivation)
are referred to as the conditioned stimulus and the conditioned response, respectively. In
the framework of a placebo response, the placebo is the bell (conditioned stimulus) and
the placebo response is the salivation (conditioned response). Initially, the unconditioned
stimulus is usually an active agent (e.g., painkiller) and the unconditioned response is its
effect (e.g., pain relief). With repeated pairings of the active agent and a neutral stimulus
(e.g., a pill or an injection), the neutral stimulus eventually becomes the conditioned
stimulus, sufficient to elicit the conditioned response of pain relief (i.e., placebo effect)
without the active agent. Purely conditioned placebo responses are difficult to study in
humans because placebo effects without expectancies (e.g., expectations, assumptions,
biases, etc.) are rare and often involve unconscious processes (Kirsch, 2004). To date,
animal studies have provided the most convincing evidence in support of the conditioning
hypothesis for placebo effects (Ader and Cohen, 1975; Herrnstein, 1962). Classical
conditioning has even been used to “train” the neurons of patients with Parkinson’s
Disease to respond to saline solution by reducing muscle rigidity (Benedetti et al., 2016).
If a conditioned stimulus activates a conditioned response, it is no surprise that the
removal of a conditioned stimulus will result in a conditioned response failing to activate.
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A study by Siegel (1983) suggests that drug tolerance can be triggered as a conditioned
response. They found that rats with heroin tolerance were more likely to die from
overdose when they were injected with tolerable levels of heroin in an environment not
previously associated with drug administration than in an environment that was. They
hypothesized that the overdose resulted from a failure in the rats’ tolerance mechanisms,
which were activated in part by environmental cues. They speculated that human drug
overdoses may also at times be a result of this same phenomenon.

2.2.2 Expectancy. Another mechanism implicated in the placebo effect is
expectancy. Expectancy is considered a central PR mechanism (Finniss, Kaptchuk, Miller
& Benedetti, 2010; Enck, Bingel, Schedlowski, & Rief, 2013) and it boasts the most
empirical support among all placebo mechanisms (Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, &
Damasio, 2005). It has even been known to override active pharmacological effects
(Kirsch, 1990).
The response expectancy theory suggests that human experiences are determined
in part by expectations (Kirsch, 1985; 1997). This theory posits that receiving a placebo
under the guise of active treatment can create an expectation of an effect, which increases
the likelihood that that effect will actualize (Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004). In other
words, the expectancy of feeling better or worse upon receiving treatment will bring
about self-fulfilling effects that will increase the chance that the person will feel better or
worse. This theory explains conditioning as a means through which one forms
expectations, which in turn produces the actual effects.
The lay term, “self-fulfilling prophecy” is often used to describe situations in
which expectancy plays a major role in bringing about an expected outcome. This
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phenomenon involves many social psychological theories. Confirmation bias makes a
person more apt to seek, notice, and interpret stimuli or symptoms in ways that are
consistent with their expectancies (Geers, Helfer, Weiland & Kosbab, 2006). Seeking out
certain symptoms will increase the chance that one will find them; deliberate
focus/attention will increase the chance that one will suddenly notice even subtle
symptoms, new and old; and interpretations often leverage any ambiguity in a situation to
pull the findings in the expected direction (Geers, Weiland, Kosbab, Landry and Helfer,
2005). Along with the increased chance of finding evidence that are consistent with
expectations, there is also an increased chance of overlooking or dismissing evidence that
are inconsistent. The expectancy effect suggests that people tend to behave in ways that
increase the likelihood of an expected outcome (Geers, Helfer, Weiland & Kosbab,
2006). For example, the belief that a treatment will improve sleep may lead subjects to
unconsciously make subtle changes to sleep-related habits, thus improving their sleep
independent of the actual treatment. In sum, not only are people more likely to notice
changes that are consistent with their expectations and overlook those that are not, they
are also likely to act in ways more likely to bring about expected changes. Such
tendencies can lead them to inadvertently behave in ways that bring about real changes,
misinterpret symptoms, and/or spuriously attribute them to a treatment.
Branthwaite and Cooper (1981) found that in 835 women who reported that they
regularly treated headaches with over the counter analgesics, brand name analgesic and
placebo were superior to their unlabeled equivalents. They randomly assigned subjects to
one of four groups: (1) unlabeled placebo, (2) labeled placebo (marked with a popular
and widely advertised brand name in the United Kingdom), (3) unbranded aspirin, and
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(4) branded aspirin. Subjects reported their pain relief an hour after taking the pills. The
results showed that aspirin was more effective than placebo, brand name aspirin was
more effective than unbranded aspirin, and brand name placebo was more effective than
unlabeled placebo. Fifty-five percent of those who took branded placebo reported
significant improvement while 45% of those who took unbranded placebo reported such
improvement.
Perceptions of cost are capable of altering the placebo response in clinical studies
as well. Espay et al (2015) conducted a prospective double-blind study with 12 moderate
to severe Parkinson disease patients. Although both placebos improved motor function,
the expensive placebo significantly improved motor function and decreased brain
activation in a direction and magnitude comparable to, albeit less than, levodopa.
Researchers found that participants who purchased and consumed an energy drink
claimed to increase mental acuity for a discounted price were unable to solve as many
puzzles as those who had paid full price, as well as those who had not consumed the
drink (Shiv, Carmon, & Ariely, 2005). The results from the initial study and a follow-up
study were all consistent in that they could be attributed to expectancy effects on the
basis that lower cost tends to positively correlate with lower performance and quality
(e.g., Gerstner 1985; Huber & McCann, 1982; Rao & Monroe 1989).
Even bodily states that are not as easily consciously manipulated can be affected
by expectations. A study found that a plac=ebo could stimulate or depress heart rate and
blood pressure based on which the subjects were primed with (Kirsch, 1997). Similarly,
researchers found that a placebo could have either muscle tension or relaxation effects
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based on which study instruction the subjects were primed with (Flaten, Simonsen, &
Olsen, 1999).
Often accompanying expectancy is the psychological effect of reassurance. The
belief that one is being treated for an ailment is likely to result in some reduction of
anxiety by virtue of increasing the perception of control over the situation. Turner et al.
(1994) hypothesized that this reduction in anxiety could bring about improvements to
immunological functioning that would explain at least part of the observed placebo
effects. However, this theory fails to account for placebo effects in healthy individuals,
negative placebo effects (e.g., undesirable side effects), and effects unlikely to be
attributed to a reduction in anxiety (Kirsch, 1997). It is nonetheless possible that this
theory can help to explain what contributes to certain placebo responses considering that
reassurance has been linked to reductions in anxiety (Lucock, Morley, White & Peake,
1997; Conroy et al., 1999), and lower anxiety levels have long been associated with a
wide range of health benefits. Furthermore, reassurance may instill confidence in
individuals to resume activities and routines that may have been put on hold due to fear
of exacerbating their conditions. This return to normalcy can also lead to further
improvements. Thus, the anxiety reduction hypothesis is not so much at odds with
expectancy theory as it is a complement to it.
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2.2.3 Conditioning versus expectancy. The main criticism of the expectancy
theory has been its difficulty in accommodating situations where a basic physiological
response occurs as a result of a placebo. A good example would be the aforementioned
study by Ader and Cohen (1975), in which rats were conditioned to have an
immunosuppressive response to sweetened water. Surely the rats did not “expect” their
immune systems to be suppressed. Conditioning still appears to be the most likely culprit.
The main criticism of conditioning is that it does not offer explanations for
instances in which there is a response even though the placebo is encountered for the first
time and/or the effects adhere to the expectations of the responder. For example, when
the same drink produces opposite effects within the same person based on its label.
These two theories have traditionally been regarded as competing placebogenic
mechanisms (Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004), with some authors finding in favor of
classical conditioning (e.g., Voudouris, Peck & Coleman, 1990) and others in favor of
expectancy theory (e.g., Kirsch, 1997). The prevailing view, however, is that both
contribute significantly. Both expectancies and conditioning are believed to be triggered
independently, and their effects are additive (Amanzio & Benedetti, 1999). In most cases,
placebo effects are mediated by expectancies, and conditioning is just one means by
which expectancies are initially formed and subsequently activated (Kirsch, 1985; Kirsch,
2004; Rescorla, 1988; Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2005; StewartWilliams & Podd, 2004; Tolman, 1932).
While conditioning does appear to play the dominant role in PR of animals and in
humans when truly unconscious physiological functions are concerned, expectancy may
assert dominance when conscious perception is concerned (Benedetti, 2003; Siegel,
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1983). Based on these observations, Stewart-Williams and Podd (2004) chose to
differentiate between conditioning and expectancies by defining the former as
unconscious and the latter as consciously accessible. This is understandable given that
conditioned PR without expectancies are rare in humans and often do involve
unconscious processes (Kirsch, 2004). However, this distinction does not appear to be
generalize to all situations. For example, an experienced driver on a familiar route will
shift gears, activate turn signals, turn the steering wheel, and alternate between pedals, all
automatically without deliberate focus on the act of driving. Nonetheless, the driver can
also choose to consciously access what is occurring. That one is not paying active
attention to a behavior does not make it unconscious. Thus, conditioning, while often
automatic, is not always unconscious.
On the other hand, there may also be insufficient evidence to support the
assumption that all expectancies are conscious. People often lack insight into their
internal state and are not always aware of their expectations. For example, Crum, Corbin,
Brownell, and Salovey (2011) found that placebo effect could bring about satiety that was
detected via hormonal changes, but not by self-report. On two separate occasions, one
week apart, forty-six participants consumed a 380-calorie milkshake under the pretense
that it was either a 620-calorie “Indulgence” shake or a 140-calorie “Sensibility” shake.
Blood samples were drawn at three time points: baseline, before, and after. Researchers
compared the levels of ghrelin, a peptide known as the "hunger hormone." Indulgence
produced a steep decline in ghrelin, indicating satiation, whereas Sensibility produced a
relatively flat ghrelin response. Participants’ ghrelin satiety was consistent with what they
believed they were consuming rather than its actual nutritional value. Meanwhile, self-
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report of satiety showed no difference. Human behavior and experience are often affected
by expectancies, assumptions, and/or biases, unconsciously and automatically (Kirsch &
Lynn, 1999), especially when the expectancies are deeply ingrained and the behaviors are
routine (Norman & Shallice, 1986). The frustrating lack of insight that some individuals
have regarding their own expectations may perhaps be further testament to this. It is, after
all, our expectancies that often determine what we choose to experience and contribute to
what we experience, which in turn shape our expectancies.

2.3 Placebogenic Moderators
While PR mechanisms consist of conditioning and/or expectancy, the valence and
strength of the associations and/or expectations are determined by the interaction between
the responder and the situation. In the following section, internal/idiosyncratic
moderators and external/contextual moderators are discussed.

2.3.1 Internal/idiosyncratic moderators. Returning to our early discussion: Who
are these so-called placebo responders? The ability to distinguish between placebo
responders and non-responders would benefit both research and clinical fields. First, it
would allow clinical trials to remove a confounding variable and improve its ability to
identify efficacious treatments. Second, it could help inform and guide treatment for
patients who are responsive, for whom there are no safe, effective, or viable treatments.
Are some individuals more likely to respond to placebos? The ability to
distinguish between placebo responders and non-responders would be greatly beneficial
in two ways. First, it would allow researchers to better identify and control for individuals
that are most likely to respond to placebo. Second, and more importantly, it would help
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inform treatment for patients who are identified as placebo responders. The growing
consensus in the field however is that there is no such universal “placebo responder” and
any exploration of placebogenic factors must take into account responder personality
traits, situational variables, as well as relevant underlying neurobiological mechanisms
(Jakšić, Aukst-Margetić, & Jakovljević, 2013).
In the 1950s, researchers, seemingly motivated by the former application of
identifying (and removing) placebo responders, sought to determine whether they shared
common personality traits (Beecher, Keats, Mosteller, & Lasagna, 1953). Experiments
conducted at the time implicated a wide range of personality characteristics associated
with responders, but the findings were inconsistent and no clear personality profile
surfaced (Doongaji, Vahia, & Bharucha, 1978). Indicative of the frustration within the
medical field, literature at the time portrayed placebo responders in a quasi-pathological
light, such that they might be exceptionally suggestible, acquiescent, neurotic, and/or
unsophisticated (Handfield-Jones, 1953). Platt (1947) commented, "the frequency with
which placebos are used varies inversely with the combined intelligence [sic] of the
doctor and his patient" (p. 307). Handfield-Jones (1953) later echoed these sentiments,
"some patients are so unintelligent, neurotic, or inadequate as to be incurable, and life is
made easier for them by placebo" (p. 305). By the 1970s, there was a growing consensus
that placebo responders lacked a psychological “fingerprint.” It was not until recently that
researchers, equipped with technological advancements, resumed tackling the challenge
of identifying specific personality traits that moderate the strength of placebo responses.

2.3.2 Characterological (personality). A study by Schweinhardt, Seminowicz,
Jaeger, Duncan, and Bushnell (2009) suggested that “dopaminergic” personality traits—
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such as novelty/fun seeking, harm avoidance, and reward responsiveness—could account
for a significant portion of an analgesic placebo response. Twenty-two healthy males
were recruited to participate in the study. Once assessed for personality traits, participants
underwent a two-phase pain challenge in which their legs (both right and left) were
injected with saline solution for twenty minutes. Ordinary non-medicated lotion was
applied to the injection site of both legs but participants were informed that one leg
received an experimental analgesic ointment while the other received a non-medicated
lotion. Participants’ ratings were analyzed and the results suggested that those who
responded to the placebo also scored higher on tests that gauged novelty-seeking
personalities. Finally, an MRI was taken for all the participants and the results suggested
a three-way relationship between placebo responders, dopaminergic personality traits,
and the volume of gray matter in the ventral striatum, insula, and prefrontal cortex.
Despite methodological issues with a small homogenous sample, the findings were
consistent with Zubieta, et al.’s (2005) reward-anticipation dopamine hypothesis
(discussed shortly) and raised the possibility that analgesic placebo response may be
enhanced in those with dopaminergic personality traits.
Peciña et al. (2013) examined the link between personality traits and placebo
analgesia in terms of both self-report measures (i.e., pain ratings) and objective
neurophysiological measures (i.e., molecular imaging and plasma cortisol levels). They
had forty-seven healthy participants (19 males, 28 females) complete a battery of
psychological inventories chosen to measure various trait dimensions. Participants then
underwent a pain challenge during which their brains were monitored via a positron
emission tomography (PET) scanner for µ-opioid neurotransmission. The pain was
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administered intravenously via 15-second saline injection to the masseter (i.e., jaw)
muscles of each participant. In the placebo condition, participants received a saline
injection disguised as a painkiller. Blood was also drawn from some of the patients and
tested for cortisol levels. Levels of expectancy and subjective assessment of placebo
efficacy were also measured before the experiment began by asking participants to rate
the degree of relief they expected to experience. Results suggested that traits such as
resilience, high agreeableness (including altruism and straightforwardness), and low
neuroticism (low levels of angry hostility, in particular) accounted for a quarter of the
variance in the placebo response. Furthermore, in participants high on personality traits
such as altruism, resiliency, and straightforwardness, PET scans revealed greater µ-opioid
transmission in the anterior cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and nucleus
accumbens. These participants were also more likely to report greater pain relief from the
placebo injection. Despite the endogenous opioid activation elicited by the placebo
analgesic, cortisol levels were not influenced by the placebo or personality traits. Results
also suggested that general optimism did not have a significant relationship with
analgesic placebo response. Many of the cited analgesic placebo studies only provide
preliminary evidence and will need to be replicated with larger and more diverse samples.
Furthermore, since most of the studies dealt with analgesic placebo responses, whether
personality and neurobiological factors implicated in pain relief generalize to other forms
of placebo effects remains to be seen.
Other studies have found dispositional optimism to be associated with a higher
likelihood of experiencing positive placebo effects, and pessimism to be associated with a
higher likelihood of experiencing negative placebo effects (Geers et al., 2005, 2007,
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2010). Construal level theory (CLT) argues that a higher perceived likelihood of an event
occurring leads to a smaller hypothetical distance, which leads to lower-level processing
strategies (Trope & Liberman, 2010). In other words, optimists may be more likely to
expect active treatment and thus be more sensitive to changes. If so, then personality
traits that are associated with greater expectancies may lead to greater placebo
responsivity.
Horing, Weimer, Muth and Enck (2014) reviewed twenty methodologically
rigorous studies, most with pain as the dependent variable, to determine the predictors
(determinants) of placebo responsiveness. They found that most predictors were
cognitive constructs related to expectancy, such as self-efficacy, locus of control, and
emotional valence. Dopaminergic personalities described as fun seeking, sensation
seeking, and high in neuroticism were also found to be predictive.

2.3.3 Neuropsychobiological. It was the discovery of endorphins that led to the
identification of neurobiological correlates in placebo studies. Endorphins are
endogenous chemicals produced by the central nervous system and pituitary gland to
inhibit the transmission of pain signals. They are essentially brain-secreted painkillers
that have similar effects as opiates. Until its discovery, researchers could only speculate
about the biological mechanisms underlying the placebo effect. Levine, Gordon, and
Fields (1978) conducted a study to investigate the possible role of endorphins in
analgesic placebo responders. Studying postoperative dental patients (recovering from
wisdom tooth removal), they found that those who received intravenous administration of
a placebo analgesic (i.e., saline) reported pain relief. However, without modern imaging
techniques, they were unable to conclude whether pain relief among responders was the
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result of endorphins produced in their brains, or something else. In the second phase, the
researchers administered Naloxone intravenously to the placebo recipients. Naloxone is
an opioid antagonist that was developed to counter the effects of opiate overdose (e.g.,
heroin, morphine). It binds to µ-opioid receptors in the central nervous system, thereby
preventing opiates from doing so. Since endorphins secreted in our brains also bind to
these same receptors, Naloxone can block its effects. The Naloxone administered to the
placebo recipients had different effects in responders versus non-responders. Placebo
responders experienced a rapid increase in pain while non-responders reported no change.
The results suggested that endorphins were indeed involved in the analgesic placebo
effect, its production was triggered by the suggestion of relief, and the endogenous
painkiller’s effects could be negated by Naloxone.
The classic experiment by Olds and Milner (1954) implicated the role of the
dopaminergic reward system when they showed that a rat with an electrode implanted in
the nucleus accumbens—a brain region involved in reward and pleasure—would reward
itself by hitting a lever that would transmit weak electrical currents to the electrode. The
following decades brought along with it a wave of neurobiological advancements that
provided further understanding of placebo effect mechanisms. Zubieta and colleagues
(2005) later identified the nucleus accumbens as playing a crucial role in placebo
analgesia. They hypothesized that the expectations of pain relief, like the rat hitting the
lever, could boost dopamine levels in the brain, which would in turn release µ-opioids
(endorphins) to provide relief. Current research suggests that the nucleus accumbens has
a major role in dopaminergic reward mechanisms related to outcome expectancy
(Lidstone et al., 2010; Setlow, Schoenbaum, & Gallagher, 2003; Tobler, Fiorillo, &
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Schultz, 2005). The involvement of dopaminergic reward has been demonstrated for PR
in analgesia (Zubieta et al., 2009), Parkinson’s Disease (Lidstone, 2010), and other
diseases (Benedetti et al., 2001). It has been hypothesized that dopaminergic activity is
responsible for the peculiar trend of placebo-controlled smoking (i.e., nicotine) cessation
trials demonstrating the lowest PR rates of all cessation trials, including addictions such
as alcohol, cocaine, and opioids (Enck, Weimer, & Klosterhalfen, 2014; Moore &
Aubin, 2012). There is evidence to show that nicotine is a potent stimulus for striatal
dopamine release (Smolka, Budde, Karow, & Schmidt, 2004) and it has been speculated
that smokers may be less susceptible to placebo-induced rewarding mechanisms
(Lidstone, 2010). In addition to dopaminergic reward, PR can be activated via many
neurobiological pathways, depending on which biological systems are examined (Enck et
al, 2013). Studies have identified other possible biological PR mediators such as oxytocin
(Enck & Klosterhalfen, 2009; Kessner et al, 2013), cannabinoids (Benedetti, Amanzio,
Rosato, & Blanchard, 2011), and nitric oxide (Fricchione & Stefano, 2005).
Burke, Kaptchuk, and Pascul-Leone (2018) note that there is strong evidence
through recent studies in neuroimaging, neurophysiological, and neuropharmacology that
“placebos meaningfully and relevantly modulate brain networks and neurotransmitter
systems” (p. 15).
2.3.4 Genetic. There is emerging evidence to suggest there may be a genetic
component to placebo responding. Hall et al. (2012) found evidence that Val158Met, a
single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) in the Catechol-O-methyl transferase (COMT)
gene, could be a biomarker for placebo responders, at least in studies of irritable bowel
syndrome. COMT regulates the amount of dopamine in the prefrontal and midbrain
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regions by breaking them down. The Val158Met SNP causes lower enzymatic activity,
which results in greater levels of dopamine in the brain. Similar results were found in
subjects with a subdued form of monoamine oxidase A, another enzyme that regulates
dopamine, to be associated with stronger placebo responses in depression (Leuchter,
Mccracken, Hunter, Cook, & Alpert, 2009). This particular SNP of the COMT gene has
also been associated with personality traits such as extraversion (Reuter & Hennig, 2005),
harm avoidance (Hashimoto, et al., 2007), numerous anxiety-related traits (Stein, Fallin,
Schork, & Joel, 2005), as well as increased risk for developing bipolar disorder and
schizophrenia (Silberschmidt & Sponheim, 2008). The association between this SNP and
addiction is also well established (David et al., 2013). Unsurprisingly, Hall and
colleagues observed the strongest placebo responses in subjects with the SNP who also
had positive relationships with their practitioners, suggesting that there is an important
interaction between environmental factors and genetic biomarker in determining the
placebo response.
Kaptchuk (2018) argues that placebo effects, especially open placebos are less
cognitive constructs and more neurological processes.

2.4 External/Contextual Moderators
The following section discusses some of the moderators most relevant to the
current study cited in the literature.

2.4.1 Previous experiences and social learning. Prior experience has been
proposed to moderate the PR (Porro, 2009). Studies have found that subsequent placebo
responses are stronger when an active treatment is administered first, compared to

31

Getting the Benefit of the Doubt
placebos given for the first time (e.g., Batterman, 1966; Batterman and Lower, 1968;
Laska and Sunshine, 1973; Sunshine et al, 1964). Colloca and Benedetti (2006)
demonstrated that PR is a learning phenomenon in which previous experiences moderate
subsequent placebo strength. Participants were assigned to one of two conditions:
effective treatment or ineffective treatment. All participants were exposed to painful
stimulation and those in the first group were led to believe they received an effective
treatment (by having the intensity of the painful stimulation reduced surreptitiously)
while those in the second group received ineffective treatment (unchanged intensity).
After 4-7 days, participants underwent the same procedure but conditions were reversed
such that participants that first received effective treatment were given ineffective
treatment, and vice-versa. Interestingly, PR following the effective-ineffective treatment
sequence was significantly greater than the ineffective-effective sequence. In other
words, the experience from the first treatment was more indicative of subsequent PR than
the more recent experience. Essentially, the primacy effect prevailed over the recency
effect, at least in the context of 4-7 days. It is plausible, however, that greater latency
would have led to different results.
Previous experience is important in providing a reference point for what is to be
expected of the treatment during subsequent exposures and to reinforce previous
experiences. In other words, more experience to confirm the effects of an active treatment
results in a stronger response to a subsequent placebo (to the extent that it is expected).
For analgesia, it was shown that receiving two active treatments prior to placebo (drugdrug-placebo) strengthened the painkilling effect of the placebo compared to receiving
only one active treatment (drug-placebo), which was stronger than a single placebo first
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treatment (Amanzio and Benedetti, 1999). This is consistent with not only conditioning,
but also expectancy.
Colloca and Benedetti (2009) assigned 48 healthy female participants to one of
three groups: social observation, first-hand experience, and verbal suggestion. Subjects
were trained to associate a green light on the computer screen with analgesia and red light
with no analgesia. An electric shock followed either green or red light. Those in the
social observation group observed a demonstration of a confederate benefitting from
analgesia in the presence of the green light. Those in the first-hand group were led to
believe that the analgesic treatment was effective (by having the stimulus intensity
reduced in the presence of the green light). Those in the verbal suggestion group were
simply instructed to expect benefit when they saw the green light. Results indicated that
analgesic PR in the social observation group was substantial and similar to those in the
first-hand group. Meanwhile, PR in the verbal suggestion group was significantly lower
than the former two. Additional psychological measures collected suggested that PR via
social observation was positively correlated with empathy scores. Keen to the fact that
this study only involved female participants, a later study investigated sex differences and
found that observational learning was more effective in men than women (Swider &
Babel, 2013).
Mazzoni, Foan, Hyland, and Kirsch (2010) demonstrated that negative PR can
also be brought about through the same social learning process. Healthy participants
inhaled air that was described as containing a toxic substance known to cause nausea,
headache, itchy skin, and drowsiness. Participants who had previously observed a
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confederate experiencing the symptoms were significantly more likely to experience
them themselves (Mazzoni et al., 2010).
Would learning that one had responded to a placebo change his/her future
expectations and responding? Chung et al. (2007) examined the aftereffects of informing
individuals about their PR and whether it would impact their future responsiveness. In the
first study, 11 participants with IBS who had experienced a PR were interviewed. The
results indicated that it did not impact their attitude towards and trust of experimenters,
treatments, or participation in future studies, although they noted a slight increase in
frustration. In the second study, 77 undergraduates were assigned to one of three
conditions: placebo, control, or repeated baseline. No differences were found in future PR
between participants who were informed of their previous PR versus those who were not.
No adverse effects were found on mood and other attitude variables assessed. This may
not be the case with trials in which greater levels of pain are involved. In short, the results
suggest that knowledge that one has experienced a PR does not affect one’s future ability
to experience a PR, at least in healthy volunteers.

2.4.2 Social interaction. Social interaction has been shown to moderate the PR
(Benedetti, 2012). Post-operative patients who had analgesic drugs administered by a
physician required far lower dose of medicine to achieve a 50 percent reduction in pain
compared to those who had the drugs administered by a pre-programmed infusion
machine. However, because the conditions differed in ways other than physician contact,
only tentative conclusions could be drawn. In the former condition, the physician
informed the patient about the injection’s powerful analgesic properties and that pain
relief could be expected within minutes, whereas in the latter condition no such
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information was provided. (Colloca, Lopiano, Lanotte, & Benedetti, 2004; Amanzio,
Pollo, Maggi, & Benedetti, 2001; Benedetti, Amanzio, & Maggi, 1995).
Sham acupuncture (with retracting needles) provided greater symptom relief in
patients with IBS when the procedure was coupled with a long supportive/empathetic
interaction than with a brief business-like communication (Kaptchuk et al., 2008).. Both
base (business-like) and enhanced (supportive) sham treatments produced significant
improvements compared to no-treatment control but the enhanced treatment produced
greater and more sustained PR in a treatment refractory population (Kaptchuk et al.,
2008). Results indicated that 44% of those that received the base treatment and 62% of
those that received the enhanced treatment reported improvements in IBS symptoms.
The power of social interaction contributes to the difficulty in conducting
placebo-controlled studies because in many situations, eliminating social interactions is
virtually impossible. Most research involves numerous opportunities for social interaction
by clinicians, assistants, receptionists, and the like. Any interaction with a participant can
potentially impact the PR. For example, psychotherapy process-outcome studies often
struggle to design viable placebo therapies because there are theories that argue that
many forms of social interactions in and of themselves can be effective therapeutic agents
that lead to significant improvements (Common Factors Theory; Imel & Wampold,
2008). Common factors include therapeutically essential factors such as hope, warmth,
empathy, confidence, autonomy, rapport, humility, and open-mindedness (Tracey et al.,
2003). A study by Benedetti, Carlino, and Pollo (2011) removed the placebo
(psychosocial provider interaction) component by having study participants who were
already hooked up to IVs and were unaware that they were being administered hidden
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infusions of IV medication (via a computer controlled infusion pump). This design
enabled the researchers to analyze just the effects of the medication without having to
consider the other possible variables that may possibly be a contributing factor. They
found this to significantly lower the effects of the active medication.

2.4.3 Hope and desire. Expectations and hope often correlate positively, but
logic suggests they are independent of one another. For example, an individual who is to
receive a radically experimental treatment may hope that his condition will improve
without much expectation that it will. Hope has been hypothesized as a PR moderator
(Beecher, 1955). However, the problem of studying hope is that it is particularly difficult
to bring about experimentally as it tends to become a factor only when the stakes
(perceived impact) are higher. Researchers have noted that PR in pain have been
observed to be stronger in clinical settings relative to experimental (e.g., Beecher, 1955;
Evans, 1974) and have wondered whether hope was a factor in that disparity. Even in
experimental settings, it has been observed that pain of greater intensity and longer
duration are associated with larger PR (Jospe, 1978). de la Cruz, Hui, Parsons, and
Bruera (2010) found that more than half of the patients with advanced cancer enrolled in
two fatigue trials responded to placebo. In both cases, a worse baseline physical wellbeing score was associated with greater placebo response. It could be speculated that as
situations become increasingly dire, the separation between hope and expectancy
disappears. This would be adaptive to survival since hope is more likely to have a higher
ceiling than expectancy.
If hope is a factor, what can be made of the placebo-induced side effects? It seems
unlikely that individuals would hope for side effects. If hope is a factor, it may limited to
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the desirable PR. It is important to note, however, that desirability is extremely subjective
and not always conscious. It is thus possible that PR considered undesirable to most
could involve hope by virtue of benefitting the responder in less obvious ways, such as
seen in factitious disorder, in which patients report physical symptoms for unconscious
secondary gain such as attention or sympathy (Oyama, Paltoo & Greengold, 2007). It is
also possible that placebo side effects can be considered desirable to the extent that they
can be interpreted as evidence of receiving active treatment. In sum, although no
conclusive evidence exists, it seems plausible that desirable PR involves elements of both
hope and expectation while the former is largely a non-factor in undesirable PR (unless
perhaps the hope is a factor in avoiding undesirable treatment effects). Desirable and
undesirable placebo effects need not share the same mechanisms, after all. Furthermore,
it is also possible that expectancies have greater influence over placebo responses when
the stakes are relatively mild, while hope may exert greater influence as situations
become more serious.
One particular study that manipulated hope may provide some insight into the
matter. Richter (1957) eliminated hope in rats by exposing them to inescapable scenarios,
such as restraining them by hand or trapping them in cylindrical glass jars filled with
water. He observed that restrained rats were quick to “freeze” and cease struggling.
Trapped rats were similarly quick to “give up” and drown, often within minutes (this was
especially true for wild rats compared to domesticated). The researcher then eliminated
“hopelessness” in the restrained rats by alternating between holding them and freeing
them, and in the trapped rats by alternating between putting them into the swimming jars
and taking them out. Later, when they were returned to their original inescapable
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conditions, the restrained rats continued to struggle and the trapped rats swam for days
before eventually succumbing to exhaustion. The researcher surmised that once the rats
realized that escape was possible—that the situation was not hopeless—it drove them to
keep going. Could it be that hope drives individuals to seek signs of improvement? A
conceptually related but less morbid classic experiment by Seligman (1968) and a dog
would later provide insight into the concept of learned helplessness.

2.4.4 Cognitive dissonance. Expectations of undesirable outcomes can lead to
cognitive dissonance, which in turn can moderate the PR. Cognitive dissonance occurs
when an individual experiences psychological discomfort because two or more beliefs or
attitudes held are in conflict with one another (Festinger, 1962). The cognitive dissonance
theory asserts that such contradictory, inconsistent, or incompatible cognitions/behaviors
that result in psychological discomfort can be reduced through a process called
dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957). He proposed three ways in which individuals
engage in dissonance reduction: (1) to change one or more of the dissonant
cognitions/behaviors, (2) to minimize the perceived impact of the dissonant
cognitions/behaviors, or (3) to introduce new cognitions/behaviors that help to reduce
dissonance. It is important to note that none of the strategies were considered to be
mutually exclusive. For example, an individual who has invested a great deal of resources
in a treatment, such as time, effort, and/or money, is likely to believe that the treatment if
effective. If information inconsistent with this belief is introduced (e.g., new research that
suggests the treatment is inefficacious), cognitive dissonance will ensue and the
individual may engage in one or more of the dissonance reduction strategies. The
individual might minimize the amount of resources spent, discount the credibility of the
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new research, seek out other studies that have found in favor of the treatment’s efficacy,
and/or even imagine gains to strengthen his/her conviction.
The same post-hoc justification occurs when effort is expended rather than
money, referred to as “effort justification.” Effort can refer to the cost of enduring
unpleasant experiences such as pain/suffering (Axsom, 2007). In short, greater perceived
effort begets greater perceived value (Festinger, 1957). Beliefs facilitative to effort
justification are ingrained into our daily expectations as evidenced by common idioms
such as, “You get what you pay for” and "Good medicine tastes bitter."
Totman (1976) conducted a pilot in which he examined post-decisional
dissonance with 11 hospital inpatients with insomnia. He presented one group with a
choice between two barely distinguishable placebo sleeping pills but no extrinsic
justification (low-justification) and another group with no choice but high justification.
Patients in the choice group slept two hours longer on average per night than those in the
high-justification group (who were not offered a choice). It was hypothesized that those
who had made a decision regarding their own treatment derived greater benefits from the
treatment than their counterparts who were not provided with the same opportunity to
make a decision. The lack of psychological measures collected made it impossible to
conclude whether the difference was attributable to dissonance reduction. The anxietyreduction theory could have presented an alternative explanation for the results. For many
of the patients, making a choice may have led to a greater sense of control over treatment,
thus leading to a reduction in anxiety. However, the opposite could also be argued,
especially in light of emerging research to suggest that having to make difficult choices
between similarly viable choices can lead to increased anxiety (e.g., Schwarz, 2004).
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Totman, Reed, and Craig (1977) wanted to examine whether the same postdecisional dissonance could produce placebo effects to help people recover from the
common cold. Forty-eight volunteers were experimentally infected with rhinovirusinduced common colds. Subjects in the experimental condition were given a choice as to
whether or not to receive a placebo (presented as an experimental antiviral drug) while
those in the control condition were left untreated. To make the decision more difficult,
subjects were informed that those receiving the drug would need to provide a sample of
gastric juice via stomach tube at the end of the experiment. It was hypothesized that those
who were presented with a choice, regardless of their decision, would show greater
recovery, as measured by symptoms and virus excretion levels, than those who had not.
No differences were found between conditions, but results suggested that the colds
actually worsened in subjects high in introversion, presumably from the stress of the trial
(Totman, Reed & Craig, 1977).
Totman (1977) gave subjects a placebo analgesic to treat experimentally induced
pain—an injection of saline—that was described in a way to maximize anxiety (i.e.,
experimental drug with uncertainties). Subjects in the high-justification group were
offered payment and explained their contribution to science and how it could potentially
benefit others who suffer from pain. Subjects in the low-justification group did not
receive any. As hypothesized, the low-justification group reported greater pain relief,
which was attributed to the greater dissonance. An alternative explanation is that, rather
than the low-justification group experiencing greater pain relief, the high-justification
may have experienced greater pain (and thereby reporting less relief). Perhaps the extra
justifications in the high-justification group resulted in any number of psychological
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processes (e.g., fear) that could have increased pain for group members. There was
evidence at the time to suggest that anxiety could influence pain perception (Sternbach,
1968).
In a classic experiment, researchers assigned 63 college women to endure one of
three levels of initiation—none, mild, and severe—prior to joining a discussion group.
Those who were assigned to the severe initiation group, and had endured an embarrassing
situation (i.e., reading aloud provocative words), were more likely to evaluate the group
as interesting than those assigned to the mild initiation group (Aronson & Mills, 1959).
The increased amount of effort was hypothesized to have increased the value of group
membership. It could be argued however that humans tend to associate selectivity or
difficulty of acceptance to valuable groups (Zentall, 2013). It could also be argued that
the “embarrassment test,” that required subjects to either read aloud obscene words and
graphic descriptions of sexual activity from novels in the severe condition, or sexual but
not obscene words in the mild condition, could have had the unintended effects of
physiological arousal and enhancing their attention, thus making subsequent group
discussions seem more interesting. Furthermore, the measurement of interest was
subjective.
Similar results were found in a study examining effort justification in a bogus
psychotherapy paradigm that involved no confounding task and an objective outcome
measure (Axsom & Cooper, 1985). Overweight subjects were assigned to one of three
therapy groups—high effort, low effort, or a no-treatment control—and engaged in
varying levels of cognitive tasks that were unrelated to weight loss. Those in the higheffort therapy group had lost slightly more weight than those in the low-effort and control
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groups at 3 weeks post experiment, and significantly more at 6 months. Reliable
differences were observed at 1 year follow-up. Similar results were found in therapy for
snake phobia and public speaking (Axsom, 1989). Subjects with snake phobia were
assigned to either high or low anticipated effort groups and the variable of “decision
freedom” was also manipulated. Greatest behavioral change occurred with subjects in the
high effort group but only when decision freedom was also high. Subjects with fear of
public speaking were assigned to either high or low anticipated effort groups and the
opportunity for “misattribution of arousal” was also manipulated. This was done in an
attempt to distinguish dissonance from other explanations that were not based on arousal,
such as self-perception. Greatest improvements were seen in the high effort group but
only when an opportunity for misattribution was not provided.
There is evidence to suggest that reverse inference underlies effort justification in
goal-directed behaviors. When a goal is accessible, means of fulfilling that goal are
assessed in terms of its instrumentality (usefulness). People often invest more effort into
means that appear most promising in achieving the goal. That is, instrumentality leads to
an assumption of greater effort. However, this inference is spuriously reversed such that
greater effort leads to an assumption of instrumentality. This perceived instrumentality,
not surprisingly, results in higher evaluations for the means (Labroo & Kim, 2009). In
other words, the effort required often determines perceived usefulness or meaningfulness
of a behavior and, as a consequence, its value. Similarly, because familiar material is easy
to process, people often misattribute material that is easy to process to familiarity
(Schwarz, 2004). These observations are consistent with findings that people who view
their jobs as being arduous, unpleasant, and rate them among their least pleasurable

42

Getting the Benefit of the Doubt
activities are also more likely to rate them as among their most rewarding activities
(White & Dolan, 2009).
Researchers had participants partake in a manual labor of assembling boxes,
folding origami, and building with Legos. Consistent with the effort justification
hypothesis, participants appraised their self-assembled products as equal in value to
expert-assembled ones, and further expected others to agree with their assessment. The
authors coined this the “IKEA Effect,” after the Scandinavian do-it-yourself furniture
company (Norton, Mochon, & Ariely, 2012).
While some researchers have theorized that cognitive dissonance results from
threats to self-esteem and self-concept (e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983), which obviously
require higher level processes, others have argued that its core processes are more
fundamental (e.g., Bem, 1967; Festinger, 1957). The latter hypothesis has been supported
by studies that have shown similar phenomena to exist in individuals with retrograde
amnesia, young children, and even animals.
Lieberman et al. (2001) asked individuals with retrograde amnesia to rate pictures
based on preference. They then paired pictures of equal preference and asked individuals
to choose between them. When asked to rate the pictures a second time, participants gave
higher ratings to pictures they had chosen even though they had no memory of seeing any
of the pictures (Lieberman, Ochsner, Gilbert, & Schacter, 2001). The findings suggest
that cognitive dissonance may involve implicit automatic processes with minimal
cognitive processing.
Effort justification has also been observed in animals. For example, rats and
certain bird species (e.g., pigeons, starlings) seem to prefer sources of food which require
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more effort to obtain (Aiken, 1957; Kacelnik & Marsh 2002; Lawrence & Festinger,
1962). Perhaps the resulting sense of satisfaction (or relief) makes the outcome or method
seem more desirable than its easily accessible alternatives. Perhaps, contrary to the
principle of least effort, there is an evolutionary reason for this behavior. One thing is
note is that subjects, humans and animals, in all of the studies had the benefit of energy
and health less common in ecologically valid circumstances. What if the rats and birds
were diseased? Which would they have preferred then? It could be that when energy
levels are high, we prefer rewards that require more effort (with a higher reward
potential), and when energy levels are low, we prefer rewards that require less work.
Such instincts could serve as a mechanism to maintain a natural balance and explain why
those with basic needs met are more likely to seek out challenges.

2.4.5 Locus of control. Locus of control (LOC; Rotter, 1954) has also been
implicated as a variable involved in placebo responding. LOC conceptualizes the
tendency of people to believe that control over life events resides internally within the
individual or externally with the outside world (Lefcourt, 1976). It is not surprising that
LOC may be involved in the placebo effect given a strong theoretical link between LOC
and concepts of expectancy (Bandura, 1977). It has been shown that those with more of
an external LOC were more likely to respond to placebos and experience an increase in
performance compared to those with more of an internal LOC (Enck, Bingel,
Schedlowski, & Rief, 2013). This makes sense considering those with more of an
external LOC are more likely to believe that external factors determine their ability to
succeed while the opposite is true for those with more of an internal LOC. For example,
presenting participants with an inconsequential choice can provide the illusion of control
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and thus bring about a placebo response. Gordon (1976) recruited 30 college students
(from the same university) and randomly assigned them to one of two conditions: choice
and no-choice. The participants consisted of 15 volunteers and 15 non-volunteers (i.e.,
those who did not not volunteer initially but later participated when course credit was
offered as a reward). Subjects in the choice condition were presented with a choice
between two relaxation treatments while subjects in the no-choice condition were
informed that they would be receiving the treatment chosen by another subject. All
subjects received the same audiotaped treatment regardless of group. Volunteers who
were given a choice rated the treatment as more effective than volunteers who were not.
This difference was not observed in the non-volunteers, suggesting that choice was less
important in their evaluation of the treatment. The author attributed the increase in
perceived effectiveness of the treatment to cognitive dissonance arising from their choice,
that was moderated by motivation (i.e., volunteering). However, an alternative
explanation is that the choice provided participants with an illusion of control, which has
been shown to bring about an array of benefits, including reduced anxiety and panic
symptoms (Sanderson, Rapee, & Barlow, 1989) and greater pain tolerance (Egan, 1990;
Haythornthwaite, Menefeeb, Heinberga, & Clark, 1998). Despite being widely regarded
as a trait, there is evidence to suggest that LOC should be considered both a state- and
trait-level construct (Ryon & Gleason, 2014).

2.4.6 Sociocultural. Perception and expectation are crucial factors underlying the
placebo effect and are heavily influenced by culture and values (Dolinska, 1999). After
all, culture is the lens through which people conceptualize and experience illnesses as
well as treat and recover from them. Superstition, which is heavily influenced by
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sociocultural factors, may offer insight into the potential impact of this PR moderator.
Phillips, Ruth, and Wagner (1993) compared mortality data of Chinese Americans
with illnesses and randomly selected matched controls and found associations between
birth year and mortality. Those born in years that are culturally regarded as unlucky for
their illness (e.g., “earth years,” ending with 8 or 9, are associated with tumors, lumps,
and cancer) die significantly earlier (approximately 1 to 5 years on average, depending on
the year-illness association) than those with the same medical conditions born in other
years. The phenomenon was most pronounced for those born in China. Phillips et al.
(2001) also discovered that Chinese- and Japanese-Americans die more often on the 4th,
a number culturally associated with death because it shares the same pronunciation with
the word, than any other day of the month.
Obviously, superstition can have beneficial effects as well. Damisch et al. (2010)
conducted a series of experiments with Germans to show that performance in golfing,
motor dexterity, memory, and anagram games could be improved by activating goodluck-related superstitions (e.g., having a lucky charm, saying “break a leg,” or keeping
fingers crossed). They attributed the improvements to superstition-triggered increase in
perceived self-efficacy, confidence, and task persistence.
A growing body of literature has found varying levels of placebo strengths across
different countries based on the ailments treated. For example, Moerman and Jonas
(2002) found that the placebo effectiveness for the treatment of gastric and duodenal
ulcers were high in Germany, moderate in Denmark and Netherlands, and low in Brazil.
Meanwhile, Moerman (2000) found that the placebo effectiveness for the treatment of
hypertension was lower in Germany than in all other countries studied. Moerman
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hypothesized that these differences were due to cultural differences. Indeed, with a
cultural focus on herbal medicine and emotional balance, German medicine and health
care system has been described as one of the most holistic in Europe (Maretzki, 1987;
Payer, 1996). Moreover, low blood pressure is regularly diagnosed and treated in
Germany (Payer, 1996), and the resulting hypersensitivity towards low blood pressure
could potentially inhibit their response towards any antihypertensive treatment. An
additional factor that could have contributed to differences was medication adherence,
which is also something affected by cultural views.
Such associations can take on many forms, quite literally. Studies have found that
people who suffer from frequent headaches and take pills regularly associate the shape,
the color, and even the taste of a pill with pain relief (Bendetti, Carlino & Pollo, 2011).
Not all placebos are equally effective, however. Some forms of placebos are more
effective for certain needs in certain cultures than others. For example, a recent metaanalysis found that sham surgery and sham acupuncture were more effective for
migraines than oral placebos (Meissner et al., 2013). There is evidence to suggest that
patients may be affected by the presentation of a placebo pill, such as its color (de Craen,
Roos, de Vries & Kleijnen, 1996), size (Buckalew & Ross, 1981), and even its perceived
value, while regularly priced pills are more effective than discounted versions (Waber,
Shiv, Carmon & Ariely, 2008), and brand names are more effective than generics
(Branthwaite & Cooper, 1981). In terms of color, research suggests that colored pills are
superior to white pills for pain relief; blue pills are superior to red for sleeping; and
anxiety meds work best when they come in green capsules (de Craen et al., 1996). There
also appears to be a culturally-driven hierarchy among various administration methods.
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At least in the United States, injections work best, then capsules, and finally pills
(Grenfell, Briggs, & Holland, 1961).
Another interesting cultural phenomenon is that there is evidence to suggest that
PR in U.S. trials are strengthening over time for antipsychotics (Leucht et al., 2009) and
antidepressants (Dunlop et al., 2012). Researchers at the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA; Khin, Chen, Yang, Yang, & Laughren, 2012) found that clinical trials of
schizophrenia drugs in North America are failing more frequently even though the
standards for approving drugs have not changed. Researchers seem to agree that this is
not because newer drugs are less efficacious than in the past but because placebos are
becoming more efficacious. Although they do not know why, one possibility they
propose is that the symptoms of schizophrenia patients in newer clinical trials might be
less severe than in the past, and they may be more likely to improve. Tuttle, et al. (2015)
analyzed data from 84 clinical drug trials (35 from the U.S.) for the treatment of chronic
neuropathic pain published between 1990 and 2013. Self-report ratings of pain indicated
the effects of drugs had remained constant over the 23 years while pain relief from
placebos had increased. In 1996, patients reported experiencing 27% more pain relief
from drugs than placebo, but by 2013, the advantage had dropped to only 9%. There were
no significant changes in placebo responses for trials from other areas of the world. For
whatever reason, placebo analgesics in U.S. trials are producing pain relief almost as
effective as many promising new drugs. The data also showed that longer and bigger
trials tended to result in greater placebo responses than shorter and smaller ones.
Researchers hypothesized that as U.S. trials have become increasingly expensive and
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elaborate, participants’ expectations have been altered. This may be another area where
cognitive dissonance and effort justification is in play.
Alternatively, could it be that ingredients in commonly used placebo treatments
for analgesic and antipsychotic studies are active unbeknownst to researchers? Olive oil
was once used as a placebo ingredient in a heart disease study in which the placebo group
did better than expected, and lactose was once used as a placebo ingredient in an HIV
study in which participants in the placebo group began dying (Mallinckrodt, Tamura, &
Tanaka, 2011). Or could it be that the placebo ingredients are producing side effects at
higher rates than the experimental treatments, thereby convincing subjects that they are
receiving an active treatment? One of the reasons these factors warrant legitimate concern
is because the FDA allows drug companies to manufacture their own placebos.
Pharmaceuticals often use active placebos in their studies to mimic the look, smell, taste,
and side effects as the drugs they are being compared against (Golomb et al., 2010).
Other elements of trials also require greater scrutiny. For example, has subject
recruitment changed over the years? Do subjects include more patients desperate for
treatment? Are subjects informed about study designs (e.g., active treatment, placebo,
randomization) differently now than they were in the past? Does the rise of larger and
elaborate multi-armed trials have a part in this?

2.5 Experimental Moderators
Experimental moderators conceptually belong to the category of
external/contextual moderators but were given its own section here because of its central
focus in the proposed study. Strategies employed to measure the PR and design elements
that moderate its effects are discussed.
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2.5.1 Measuring the placebo response. If placebos are to be used in research, it
must be measured somehow. Various strategies and theories on how to measure the
placebo effect have been proposed. Meta-analyses suggest that PR is most prominent
when outcome measures are continuous and subjective (Hrobjartsson & Gotzsche, 2001),
and the general consensus is that to minimize the effects of biases, objective outcome
measures must be prioritized over subjective symptom reports (Benedetti, Carlino, &
Pollo, 2011). One of the main challenges in measuring the PR is in isolating it from other
phenomena that frequently bring about changes. When exposure to a placebo and
subsequent benefits—sometimes due to other active treatments or factors such as time—
coincide, illusory causation can lead one to associate an inert treatment with efficacy
(Voudouris, Peck, & Coleman, 1989). In order to measure the PR, the aforementioned
must be ruled out. For example, natural recovery or the regression to the mean can be
confused with treatment efficacy. It is commonly understood that people more often seek
treatment for their illnesses when symptoms are moderate to severe than when mild
(McDonald & McCabe, 1989). It is also known that people tend to see more dramatic
improvement when their symptoms are most severe (McDonald & McCabe, 1989). The
temporal proximity between treatment and symptom improvement can lead to illusory
causation, in which the patient spuriously attributes perceived improvements to a
treatment. This is why Ernst and Resch (1995) argue that changes reported in the placebo
arm of trials have often been conflated with actual placebo effects and a distinction
between ‘true’ and ‘perceived’ placebo effects must be made. They argue that
confounding factors or other non-specific effects—such as the natural course of the
disease, regression towards the mean, other time effects, and unidentified parallel
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interventions—can lead to improvements that may appear attributable to placebo effects,
when in fact they are due to entirely unrelated phenomena. They argued that, in order to
obtain the “true placebo effect,” other non-specific effects resulting from the
aforementioned confounding factors must be estimated by various methods, such as the
inclusion of a no-treatment control or “natural history” group, and then subsequently
removed (Ernst & Resch, 1995). That is, the perceived placebo effects minus other
nonspecific effects leaves researchers with the true placebo effect. Others have echoed
these sentiments, arguing that a placebo response consists of a study effect plus a placebo
effect (Yang et al., 2005). The study effect represents change that occurs as a result of
participation in a clinical trial. This appears to be the equivalent of the “other nonspecific effects” discussed by Ernst and Resch (1995).
There is evidence to suggest that this additive assumption is oversimplified,
however. Studies have found that the whole is often less than the sum of its parts. It has
been shown that the effects of both painkillers and placebo overlap because they work via
similar biochemical pathways (Finniss, Kaptchuk, Miller, & Benedetti, 2010). Because of
overlaps (and the law of diminishing returns), arriving at an accurate estimate of the PR is
not as simple as subtracting the effects of confounds from the perceived PR, as was
originally suggested by Ernst and Resch (1995).
2.5.2 Open versus hidden treatments. The effects of expectancy can be removed
if a subject is unaware that he/she is receiving treatment. The difference in effects
between open and hidden treatments has been considered to represent the PR, or at least
its major component resulting from the patient's perception of the administration of the
agent (Amanzio et al., 2001; Price, 2001). When subjects were unaware they were
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receiving them (e.g., administered covertly), the analgesic properties of morphine were
cut in half (Amanzio et al., 2001), and the anxiolytic properties of diazepam disappeared
entirely (Benedetti et al., 2003). Does this mean that the PR makes up half of morphine’s
and all of diazepam’s effects? Not necessarily. Numerous explanations are possible.
While some may attribute this difference to a single placebo effect enhancing the effects
of the medicine (Amanzio et al., 2001; Price, 2001), it is also possible that it represents
the sum of two distinct placebo effects operating in opposite directions. If expectations
play a central role, then just as placebo effects can enhance effects that are expected, it
can also diminish those that are unexpected (or expected not to occur). Hidden treatments
may cause individuals to “overrule” changes—to logically dismiss any unexplained
change by default (since nothing has happened). Whether this belief suppresses
physiological changes or leads them to go unnoticed is unclear. If it is the latter, it may
not work with drastic symptom changes. It could also be that hidden placebo
administrations fail to activate some form of change monitoring or treatment receptor
mechanism that allow for changes to be recognized or for treatment to work. In short,
subjects may need to be clued in that something may happen, even if they are not
informed as to what that something may be. Similar results have been observed in studies
employing hidden participation (Bergmann et al., 1994; Dahan et al., 1986). The opposite
has been observed in rats, where open morphine administration (i.e., paired with a signal)
has yielded smaller effects than hidden morphine administration (i.e., no signal). This
may be indicative of expectancies being less of a factor in rats than in humans (e.g., Kim,
Siegel, & Patenall, 1999; Siegel & Ramos, 2002).
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In a balanced placebo design, subjects are assigned to one of four conditions: (1)
active treatments described as placebo, (2) placebo treatments described as active, (3)
active treatments described as active, or (4) placebo treatments described as placebo. The
balanced placebo design is considered to provide a direct assessment of the drug effect,
independent of expectancy. It has the advantage of having higher external validity than
double-blind administrations, because it better simulates situations in clinical practice.
Studies employing this design (e.g., Knight, Barbaree, & Boland, 1986; Rohsenow &
Marlatt, 1981; Sayette, Breslin, Wilson, & Rosenblum, 1994; Draganich & Erdal, 2014)
have shown that the different verbal instructions are capable of influencing the effects of
both drugs and placebos.

2.5.3 Randomization ratio and the placebo response. Although the 1:1 ratio has
long been considered the norm, an increasing number of studies have begun employing
unequal randomization ratios (Hey & Kimmelman, 2014). This has been spearheaded by
researchers who continue to advocate for increasing unbalanced trials (Parmar, Carpenter,
& Sydes, 2014). Diener et al. (1999) conducted an international RDBPC (Randomized
Double-Blind Placebo Control) migraine study with 1,058 subjects and a highly
unbalanced randomization ratio. It was designed to compare zolmitriptan (experimental
treatment) against sumatriptan (active comparator) and placebo. Originally planned to a
1:1:1 (drug-drug-placebo) randomization ratio, the allocation was modified to 8:8:1 at the
urging of several ethics committees citing the ethical obligation to minimize the number
of subjects exposed to placebo. Participants were explicitly informed of the 16:1 chance
of receiving an active medication versus placebo. Results indicated that there were no
statistically significant differences in complete response between groups. Complete
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headache response was defined as a reduction in headache pain from moderate/severe at
baseline to mild or no pain 2 hours after taking the medication with no moderate or
severe recurrence within 24 hours. Patients with moderate baseline headache did better in
the zolmitriptan group (48%) and sumatriptan group (40%) than placebo (27%), although
the difference between the latter two was not significant. Patients with severe baseline
headache, however, did better with placebo (44%) than zolmitriptan (27%) and
sumatriptan (35%), although the differences were not significant. The placebo response
rate in this study was far greater than that of 14 other trials involving the same
medications but with more balanced ratios ranging from 1:1 to 3:1. The authors
hypothesized that the unbalanced randomization ratios led to greater expectancy of
receiving active treatment which increased response rates to both placebo and treatment.

2.5.4 Migraine. Loder, Goldstein, and Biondi (2005) conducted a meta-analysis
examining 31 placebo-controlled migraine studies conducted between 1991 and 2002 and
concluded that placebo effects in these studies were highly substantial. They also noted
that placebo effects appeared more enhanced in studies involving children and
adolescents and that randomization rates did not appear to influence placebo rates. It is
important to note that this study only examined fully published data and that all triptan
trial results have been supported and analyzed by pharmaceutical companies. This makes
the study particularly susceptible to the “file drawer” effect, where trials that portray
triptan in a less desirable light (e.g., low triptan response rates or high placebo response
rates) may have remained unpublished. Furthermore, the inclusion criteria of the review
made no specific mention of how or if subjects were explicitly informed of the
randomization ratios and/or probability of receiving an active medication versus placebo.
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2.5.5 Depression (MDD). Khan et al. (2003) investigated the relationship
between the number of active antidepressant treatment arms and drug-placebo differences
in 52 trials between 1985 and 2000 that included FDA-approved antidepressants. A
negative correlation between the number of treatment arms and trial success was
observed. Similarly, two meta-analyses of depression trials (Papakostas & Fava, 2009;
Sinyor et al., 2010) also found that a lower likelihood of receiving active treatment (when
compared with placebo) resulted in a lower response rate to both placebo and to drug, but
the effects were not equal. Sinyor et al (2010) found higher active antidepressant and
placebo response rates (57.7% and 44.6%, respectively) in 1:1:1 drug-drug-placebo
studies compared to 1:1 drug-placebo studies (51.7% and 34.3%, respectively). The
greater difference between placebo conditions compared to active antidepressant
conditions supported the hypothesis that those assigned to placebo conditions are more
likely to “benefit” from the increase in active treatment arms, thus being more
responsible for the smaller drug-placebo difference. They hypothesized that the inclusion
of a placebo arm might reduce the effects of an active treatment because of rational
skepticism—uncertainty as to whether the subject is receiving active treatment. They
referred to this as the “lessebo effect.” The meta-analysis conducted by Papakostas and
Fava (2009) examined 182 clinical trials involving 262 drug-placebo contrasts and found
that the randomization ratio was the greatest factor in drug-placebo separation. In
Papakostas and Fava (2009)’s meta-analysis, higher placebo randomization were reported
to result in lower placebo response rates and greater separation between the response
rates to the antidepressant medication and the response rates to the placebo. A 3:1
randomization (75% active, 25% placebo) produced an average difference of 12%
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between the response to the antidepressants and the placebo while 1:1 randomization
(50% active, 50% placebo) produced a difference of 18% between the two groups.
Considering this data, Papakostas and Fava (2009) concluded that designing a study such
that 50% were assigned to the active treatment group and 50% were randomized to the
placebo group, it would modify a participant’s expectations of improvement and also
increase the ability of a trial to detect the changes as a result of treatment (p. 38).

2.5.6 Schizophrenia. Kemp et al. (2010), investigating the puzzling trend of
decreasing drug-placebo differences in recent clinical trials of antipsychotics for
schizophrenia, found that schizophrenia trials were showing a similar pattern to that of
the MDD trials. Mallinckrodt, Zhang, Prucka, and Millen (2010) reported similar
findings in their meta-analysis of all placebo controlled schizophrenia clinical trials since
1997, consisting of 27 studies and 79 drug-placebo contrasts. As allocation to placebo
increased, mean placebo response decreased (p 1⁄4 .047) and drug-placebo separation
increased (p 1⁄4 .166). In studies with drug : placebo randomization ratios less than 3:1
(i.e., more than 25% placebo), 83.3% of contrasts were significant. In studies with ratios
greater than 3:1 (i.e., less than 25% placebo), 58.3% of contrasts were significant. Other
factors associated with higher placebo response in patients with schizophrenia was
younger age and lower symptom severity (Chen, Wang, Khin, Hung, & Laughren, 2010).

2.5.7 Anxiety disorders and OCD. A recent meta-analysis by Sugarman, Kirsch,
and Huppert (2017) analyzed studies for antidepressants for the treatment of anxiety
disorders such as obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), generalized anxiety disorder
(GAD), panic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and social anxiety disorder
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and found that people with OCD have significantly reduced placebo response than people
with other anxiety disorders.

2.5.8 Irritable bowel syndrome (IBS). One study examining irritable bowel
syndrome (IBS) found the opposite. Klosterhalfen, Vase, and Enck (2010) examined 92
published IBS trials with more than 22,000 patients, 76 with a drug:placebo ratio of 1:1
and 16 with ratios 2:1 or greater. Contrary to the depression studies, they found that
lower drug and placebo responses and smaller drug-placebo differences in trials with
higher likelihoods of receiving active medication (2:1 or greater). To better control for
variability between rdb studies, they selected a subset of 20 trials of similar design and
size (i.e., a minimum of 80 subjects per arm)—ten with 1:1 ratios (n=3,782) and ten with
2:1 or greater ratios (4 with a 2:1 ratio, 3 with 3:1, and 3 with 4:1; total n=6,484) and
analyzed them. Again, they found that drug and placebo responses decreased with higher
likelihood of receiving active medicine. The placebo response went from 37.6% with 1:1
to 29.1% with 4:1, while drug response went from 49.8% with 1:1 to 42.4% with 4:1. The
reasons for this remain unclear.
2.5.9 Cognitive Testing. It has been shown that placebo effects can enhance and
be observed in performance based measures. A study by Weger & Loughnan (2013)
study found they were able to enhance the cognitive performance of participants who
were subliminally displayed the answers to the test. In Weger & Loughnan’s (2015)
study, they found that participants who were given the autonomy to choose the enhancing
treatment they received showed more improvement than participants who were assigned
their treatments. A placebo sleep study by Draganich & Erdal (2014) instructed
participants verbally of their assigned quality of sleep along with charts and graphs of
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their biofeedback readings to further reinforce the quality of sleep to which they were
assigned. Afterwards, the results of the cognitive tests they took found the participants’
cognitive functioning to be affected by their assigned quality of sleep than their initial
reported quality of sleep. If the placebo effect can be observed in performance-based
measures with a subliminal message paradigm, it can likely be observed in more typical
clinical trials with interventions that have more placebogenic potential.

2.5.10 Analgesia. A more recent meta-analysis by Vase et al. (2015) found a
pattern opposite to what would be supported by the expectancy hypothesis. They
examined pain intensity in placebo data from 9 industrially sponsored multicenter
RDBPC (Randomized Double-Blind Placebo Control) trials including 2,017 patients
suffering from chronic painful osteoarthritis (hip or knee) or low back pain. Three
expectancy-related primary predictors of (1) active medication, (2) number of planned
face-to-face visits, and (3) Randomization Ratio (RR) were examined. Although they
found that the former two (availability of opioid and high number of planned face-to-face
visits) were predictive of a greater PR, the latter ran contrary to the rest. That is, RR with
higher possibility of active medication than placebo was related to lower PR. The authors
speculated that this could be due to RR “hitchhiking” on the effects of the other 2
predictors because they were all so closely tied in the analysis (i.e., all opioid trials
included high numbers of planned face-to-face visits and a lower RR ratio of receiving
the active drug compared with placebo). They suggested that the knowledge of opioid
availability may have been the main factor leading to high placebo responses.

2.5.11 No placebo. If higher allocation to active treatment results in greater
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response rates, response rates might be expected to be highest in trials in which there are
no placebos (i.e., active comparators only). Indeed, meta-analyses show that comparator
trials, in which two or more active treatments are compared without a placebo, yield
consistently higher response rates for antidepressants than placebo-controlled trials
(Rutherford et al, 2010). Rutherford and colleagues (2009) examined 48 placebocontrolled antidepressant studies with 9,515 subjects and 42 comparator studies with
7,030 patients. They found average drug response rates in placebo-controlled studies to
be 15% lower than rates in comparator studies (35% and 50%, respectively). It has been
hypothesized that comparator trials, by virtue of including only active treatments,
produce greater expectancies of improvement than trials including placebos, which in
turn produce higher response and remission rates (Rutherford et al, 2010). Woods et al
(2005) demonstrated that the degree of improvement in subjects with schizophrenia
treated with atypical antipsychotic medications in studies with active controls was nearly
double that found in placebo-controlled trials.

2.5.12 Only placebo. Conversely, if higher allocation to active treatment results
in greater response rates, response rates might be expected to be lowest in trials in which
subjects are certain they are receiving placebos. However, there is some evidence to
suggest that response rates are still higher than would be expected. Park and Covi (1965)
recruited 15 newly admitted “neurotics” ranging in age from 19 to 67 (mean of 35 years,
with only one patient over 50 years of age). Most were female (13) and nine were
caucasian. Patients presented with varying symptoms and illnesses. They were all
instructed to take “a sugar pill… with no medicine in it at all,” three times daily (Park &
Covi, 1965). They were also told by a psychiatrist, “I think this pill will help you as it has
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helped so many others” (Park & Covi, 2010, p. 337). Of the 14 patients that returned a
week later, 13 of them were deemed to have improved markedly as assessed by various
measures completed by both patient and psychiatrist. This study was replicated in
Kaptchuk et al’s (2010) famous “honest placebo” study. In a three-week randomized
controlled trial (RCT), 80 primarily female (70%) patients were randomly assigned to
either an open-label placebo or a no-treatment control group. Those in the placebo group
were given placebo pills with the label, “placebo pills made of an inert substance, like
sugar pills, that have been shown in clinical studies to produce significant improvement
in IBS symptoms through mind-body self-healing processes.” Those in the control group
received the same treatment and quality of interaction from providers but did not receive
pills. Participants were assessed at midpoint and endpoint. The results indicated that those
in the placebo group improved significantly compared to those in the control at both
midpoint and endpoint. After three weeks, 60 percent of the placebo group reported relief
from symptoms, compared to 35 percent of the control group.
So why were placebo effects found even when the subjects knew they were taking
placebos? The first possible explanation is the one proposed by the authors of the study—
that the mere act of being treated (e.g., taking a pill) is what leads to placebo effects.
Other explanations may have to do with the study design. Although the latter study
improved upon the methodology of the former, there were still numerous limitations,
many of which the authors acknowledged. The most important were the (1) lack of
blinding, (2) lack of objective measurements (e.g., number of bowel movements a day,
time lost from work, or medication requirements), (3) high potential for selection bias,
and (4) biased instructions.
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Participants for the study were recruited through health care referrals, fliers, and
newspaper advertisements. Kaptchuk et al., (2010) study was described the study as “a
novel mind-body management study of IBS.” In other words, participants consisted of
self-selected individuals who were drawn in by the study description. Prospective
participants were also primed during the telephone screening process in which they were
told that they would receive either: no treatment or “placebo (inert) pills, which were like
sugar pills which had been shown to have self-healing properties.” Regardless of the
veracity of these statements, it appears possible that the wordings as well as the research
design itself (i.e., receiving either nothing or placebo) may have appealed only to a very
specific subset of the population. Notwithstanding these limitations, the findings from
these studies may suggest that there is a floor effect for placebo responses.
Yet another possible explanation might be that the placebo labels had the exact
opposite of the intended effect. That is, many subjects may have dismissed the
conspicuous placebo label as a deliberate attempt to fool them and instead believed that
they could be taking an active medication.

2.5.13 Optimal ratio. As trials in depression, IBS, schizophrenia, and migraine
headaches have all shown, the maximal differences between drug and placebo are
achieved with a 1:1 ratio. It should be taken into consideration that the nature of certain
disorders may impact the extent to which placebo response is effective or that the degree
of placebo responsiveness may indicate there may be a common factor among the nature
of these specific disorders. The active-placebo randomization ratio of 1:1 has been shown
to be the most efficient and valid approach, and most likely to result in the greatest
treatment-placebo difference (Meinert, 1986). Animal research has found that dopamine
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release in the striatum (i.e., area of the brain important for action-reward associations) is
maximal with a 50-50 chance of receiving reward (Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003).
Dopamine release has been found to play a major role in the human placebo response as
well (Schott, Niehaus, Wittman, Schutze, Seidenbecher, Heinze, & Duzel, 2007).
Although the traditional RR of 1:1 is considered to result in the maximum activeplacebo difference, an increasing number of modern trials employ unequal allocation
(Hey & Kimmelman, 2014). The aforementioned study by Diener et al (1999) is an
example of an unequal randomization ratio being stipulated by the ethics committees.
Mallinckrodt, Tamura, and Tanaka (2011) point out that such decisions are often a result
of negotiating a dilemma. If researchers have an ethical obligation to minimize the total
burden on study subjects (e.g., smallest number of subjects exposed to placebo), adding
more treatment arms would be preferred. However, unequal ratios are not statistically
optimal. They require larger sample sizes to achieve the same level of statistical power.
For example, to achieve the same power, randomization ratios of 2:1 and 3:1 would
require 12% and 33% more subjects than the optimal ratio of 1:1, respectively (Meinert,
1986). If 1:1 trials leverage the most power and require the fewest number of subjects to
determine relative efficacy, an argument could be made for it as well. The superiority of a
1:1 probability has been corroborated by neurobiological evidence in humans (Lidstone,
2010) and animals (Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003) showing that dopamine release is
greatest in response to maximal uncertainty in obtaining a reward.

2.5.14 Presentation of RR. The way in which the RR is disclosed may matter
immensely. The phenomenon of probability distortion described in prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1992) of behavioral economics demonstrated how the
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same probability or statistic presented in slightly different ways can lead to dramatic
changes in perceptions and conclusions. Bishop et al., (2012) studied the contents of 45
Participant Information Leaflets (PILs) from UK clinical trials and found that
randomization ratios were described in different ways. Most PILs (37, 82%) emphasized
both the placebo and the target treatment, e.g. “each participant will have a 50% chance
of receiving active [target treatment name] and a 50% chance of receiving placebo
(‘dummy’) tablets.” A portion of the PILs (6, 13%) emphasized the participant's chance
of receiving the target treatment, e.g. “there is a 1 in 2 chance that you will receive the
active treatment.” They also found that PILs frequently emphasized the target treatment
and de-emphasized the placebo. Most of the PILs (39, 87%) included the name of the
target treatment in the title, but only a minority of PILs (13, 29%) included the placebo in
the title. The placebo treatment was mentioned significantly fewer times in the PILs and
more often in the latter sections of the main body.

2.5.15 Comprehension & interpretation. There is an assumption underlying all
of the previous studies examining randomization ratios: that participants understand and
have thought about the probability of receiving active treatment. Much of mental
calculation of expectations assumes that participants can understand some research
elements (e.g. randomization) and basic probability. However, this may not be the case
with children and individuals who suffer from cognitive impairments, although no study
has actually investigated this directly. Indeed, Rutherford et al. (2011) observed that an
unbalanced RR did not seem to affect the placebo effect among children (Rutherford,
Sneed, Tandler, Randskopf, Peterson, & Roose, 2011; Weimer, Colloca, & Enck, 2015,
pg. 251).
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Lidstone et al. (2010) recruited 35 patients with Parkinson’s Disease to undergo
three PET scans: The first scan was a baseline measure, the second was done one hour
after open-label administration of antiparkinson medication. Subjects also received
medicine to prevent the side effects of the active medication (e.g., hypotension or
nausea). Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of four groups: 25% group, 50%
group, 75% group, and 100% group (the percentage representing the declared probability
of receiving active medication). In reality, all were given placebo and scanned an hour
later. Results indicated that significant dopamine release occurred only in the 75% group.
This was inconsistent with previous literature suggesting that the greatest dopamine
release should have occurred in the 50% group (e.g., Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003).
The authors speculated that because of cognitive deficits among the population,
participants may have had difficulty distinguishing between 50% and lower probabilities
of receiving active medication. Other studies have shown that unmedicated Parkinson’s
Disease can lead to impaired performance on tasks of probabilistic learning (Knowlton,
Mangels, & Squire, 1996), impaired predictive learning based on positive feedback
(Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 2004; Bodi et al, 2009), and inactivity in the ventral
striatum during reward prediction (Schott et al., 2007). Other conditions, such as
schizophrenia, are also associated with deficits in probabilistic reasoning (Menon,
Pomarol-Clotet, McKenna, & McCarthy, 2006). These results may suggest that
randomization ratios may have less influence on individuals with such deficits.
Lou et al. (2013) randomized 26 Parkinson’s disease patients to one of three
conditions: 0%, 50%, and 100% (percentage representing the declared probability of
receiving active medicine). Each group was informed that they had a certain probability
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of receiving an active medicine, levodopa, although all were given placebo. Placebo
responders were defined as those who responded with a decrease in motor-evoked
potential (MEP), which measures cortical excitability. Subjects in the 50% and 100%
groups showed a decrease in MEP, while those in the 0% group showed an increase
(P < .05). Consistent with past research in placebogenic personality traits, secondary
personality measures showed that responders were more likely to be open to experience
than nonresponders.
Many of the studies bring forth an important point and serve as examples of why
Moerman’s (2002) “meaning response” seems to be a more appropriate term than the
placebo response. Equal probability and maximum uncertainty are not always
synonymous. Probability is objective while uncertainty is subjective. In terms of PR,
what is important is not the probability but the level of uncertainty that it instills in
participants. What ultimately matters is not the participants’ understanding of what the
probability objectively implies (e.g., 3:1 is 75% chance of active treatment), but what it
subjectively means to each individual. What a 75% chance means to one person is
different from what it means to another, depending on the context. Traits such as
optimism/pessimism may lead some participants to form expectations that are greater
than or less than the actual probability of receiving active treatment. This is consistent
with the findings of Geers and colleagues (2005; 2010) that suggest those high in
dispositional optimism tend to respond more readily to placebos. Past experiences and
current circumstances can also affect how one interprets probability. As was seen in
sociocultural differences in the PR, what a specific RR (or number) means to someone is
often influenced by background. As seen in studies that examined reframing techniques,
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how an individual responds to an RR under one set of circumstances is different from
how that person responds to the same RR under different circumstances. It can also
change from moment to moment as individuals receive feedback from their environment
and their expectations change.
It is noteworthy that uncertainties can give rise to selection bias. Trials with
seemingly unfavorable randomization ratios may be rejected by more prospective
participants, leaving only those who are more optimistic, less risk averse, or do not
comprehend the actual probability of receiving an active treatment. Halpern, Karlawish,
Casarett, Berlin, Townsend, and Asch (2003) found that decreasing the active:placebo
randomization ratio (from 9:1 to 1:1) in a hypertension medication trial resulted in fewer
subjects willing to participate. Somewhere between 9:1 and 1:1, odds deemed
“worthwhile” became “not worthwhile” for many potential subjects.

2.5.16 Therapeutic misconception. As briefly alluded to earlier, participants in
general have been known to fall victim to a fallacy known as the “therapeutic
misconception.” Lidz, Appelbaum, Grisso, & Renaud (2004) showed that participants
often misinterpret the overall purpose of clinical trials and fail to comprehend and
appreciate how elements of the research design can impact their individualized clinical
care. They found that only 13.5% of participants could report any risks or disadvantages
resulting from the research design itself, such as randomization, placebos, double-blind
designs and restrictive protocols. A systematic review of informed consent and
participant comprehension of research also found therapeutic misconception and lack of
basic understanding of research elements among participants, especially in regards to
randomization, placebo, benefit, and risk (Montalvo & Larson, 2014). This
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misconception of the purpose, coupled with a lack of understanding of research designs,
can lead to participants to form optimistic expectations.

2.6 Conclusion
Studies have demonstrated that placebo response rates can be a function of the
randomization ratio (i.e., the likelihood of receiving drug/placebo), mediated by subject
expectations. The RR influences subjects’ perception of the trial, decision to participate
in a trial, and response rates to both placebo and active treatments, and can have a
significant impact on the outcome of a trial. It is unfortunate that most meta-analyses to
date have not taken into account these ratios, contrasting treatment arms versus the same
placebo condition without adjusting for the likelihood of active treatment (Mallinckrodt,
Tamura, & Tanaka, 2011). Evidence suggests that larger allocation to active treatment
(and smaller allocation to placebo) results in higher response rates to both active and
placebo treatments. As alluded to earlier, the fact that an event is more likely is known to
also change how people think about it. Construal level theory (CLT; Trope & Liberman,
2010) argues that the psychological distance between a person and an event will affect
the level at which the person processes the event. According to CLT, those who perceive
an event as more likely will tend to focus on “lower” or more concrete details (e.g.,
specific symptom changes) while those who perceive it as unlikely will tend to process it
on a “higher” or more abstract level (e.g., whether they feel better, generally). Thus,
higher randomization ratios may influence subjects into paying greater attention to detail,
and lead to higher sensitivity to subtle changes.
The purpose of the current study is to address many of the limitations associated
with previous studies by employing multiple levels of randomization ratios to determine
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whether there is a relationship between the randomization rates and placebo rates. The
current study addressed the following research questions: (1) Is there a relationship
between the randomization ratio (RR) and the placebo response (PR)? (2) Is there a
relationship between the RR and test-taking speed? (3) Is there a relationship between the
RR and assumption about the treatment received (Treatment Assumption)? (4) Are
Grammatical Reasoning Test (GRT) scores different based on the assumption of the
treatment received (treatment assumption)? (5) Which variables predict Treatment
Assumption (active or placebo)? (6) Which variables predict GRT scores? (7) Is there a
relationship between randomization ratio (RR) and expectation of and hope for efficacy?
and finally, (8) Is there a relationship between expectation of and hope for efficacy and
the placebo response (PR)?
The following eight hypotheses are proposed, based on the existing literature:
Hypothesis 1 predicts that there will be a discernible relationship between the
randomization ratio (RR) and placebo response (PR), such that the Grammatical
Reasoning Test (GRT) scores will increase with the increasing likelihood of receiving
active treatment. Hypothesis 2 predicts that there will be a discernible relationship
between the randomization ratio (RR) and the Grammatical Reasoning Test (GRT) items
attempted (i.e., test taking speed), such that GRT items attempted will increase with the
increasing likelihood of receiving active treatment. Hypothesis 3 predicts that participants
assigned to RR conditions with higher likelihoods of receiving active treatment will be
more likely to report an active Treatment Assumption than participants assigned to RR
conditions with lower likelihoods. Hypothesis 4 predicts that GRT scores will be
significantly higher among participants who report an active Treatment Assumption
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compared to those who report a placebo Treatment assumption. Hypothesis 5 predicts
that the RR group, Efficacy Expectation, Efficacy Hope, and GRT score will significantly
predict participants’ Treatment Assumptions. Hypothesis 6 predicts that after controlling
for education, the RR group, Efficacy Expectation, Treatment Assumption, and Efficacy
Estimate will significantly predict GRT scores. Hypothesis 7 predicts that there will be a
positive correlation between RR (odds of receiving active treatment) and pre-test
Efficacy Expectation and Efficacy Hope for active treatment but not placebo. Lastly,
hypothesis 8 predicts that there will be a positive correlation between GRT score and pretest Efficacy Expectation and Efficacy Hope for active treatment but not placebo.
The following table of variables and corresponding survey items is provided to
aid in comprehension of the methodology and results of the current study.
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Chapter III: Methodology
This section outlines the methodology of the study, including participants, description of
instruments/measures, and study design/procedures. Additionally, the power analysis
conducted to determine appropriate sample size has been described in this section as well.
A diagram of the study design is presented below.

Figure 1. Diagram of Study Design

3.1 Participants/Population/Sample & Data Collection
In total, 1,000 participants were recruited and included in the study. Of them,
49.1% identified as female, 50.6% as male, and .3% as other. In terms of age, 9.8% were
between the ages of 18-24, 38.9% were between the ages of 25-34, 24.4% between the
ages of 35-44, 14% were between the ages of 45-54, 9.4% were between the ages of 5564, 3.1% were between the ages of 65-74, and 0.3% were 75 or older. The ethnic
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breakdown was as follows: 78.8% identified as White or European-American, 7.7%
identified as Asian, 5.5% identified as Black or African American, 5.4% identified as
Latino/Latina, 2.1% identified as Biracial/Multiracial, 0.4% identified as American
Indian or Alaska Native, and 0.1% identified as Other. In terms of highest completed
education, 0.5% had some high school education, 9.6% were high school graduates,
25.3% had some college education, 12.6% had an associate's degree, 36.5% had a
bachelor's degree, 2.6% had some graduate school education, 10.4% had a master's
degree, and 2.4% had a doctoral or professional degree. In terms of language, 17.5%
identified as being multilingual and 97% of all participants identified English as their first
(or only) language. In terms of devices used, 91.5% (914) used a desktop or laptop, 8.4%
(84) used a phone or tablet, 0.1% (1) used an unspecified device. In terms of primary
input method, 11.3% (113) used a touchscreen, 81.3% (811) used a mouse/touchpad,
7.3% (73) used a keyboard, and 0.1% (1) used an unspecified method.
Conclusive data was missing for 0.2% of age, 0.1% of racial/ethnic, 2.8% of
education, 0.1% of linguality, 0.2% of first language, 0.1% of devices used, and 0.2% of
input methods. Table 2 and 3 provides the characteristics of the resulting sample of
respondents. As seen in the tables, the sample consisted of a near-even distribution of
female and males, primarily White or European-American, between the ages of 25 to 54,
using a mouse or touchpad on a desktop or laptop.
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Table 2
Characteristics of Sample.
Variable
Gender
Female
Male
Other

n (%)
491 (49.1%)
506 (50.6%)
0 (0%)

Age
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+

98 (9.8%)
388 (38.9%)
244 (24.4%)
140 (14.0%)
94 (9.4%)
31 (3.1%)
3 (0.3%)

Race/Ethnicity
White/European American
Biracial/Multiracial
Latino/Latina
Asian
Black/African American
Other
American Indian
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander

787 (78.8%)
21 (2.1%)
54 (5.4%)
77 (7.7%)
55 (5.5%)
1 (0.1%)
4 (0.4%)
0 (0%)

Education
Elementary
Middle
Some High School
High School Grad
Some College
Associates degree
Bachelors degree
Some graduate school
Masters degree
Doctoral/Professional degree

0 (0%)
0 (0%)
4 (0.46%)
84 (9.6%)
221 (25.3%)
110 (12.6%)
318 (36.5%)
23 (2.6%)
91 (10.4%)
21 (2.4%)

Multilingual
Yes
No

175 (17.5%)
824 (82.4%)

First Language English
Yes
No

968 (97.0%)
30 (3.0%)

Device Used
Desktop/Laptop
Phone/Tablet
Other

914 (91.5%)
84 (8.4%)
1 (0.1%)

Primary Input Method
Touchscreen
Mouse/Touchpad

113 (11.3%)
811 (81.3%)
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Table 2 (continued).
Keyboard
Other

73 (7.3%)
1 (0.1%)

Note. N=1,000
Participants were recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk;
http://www.mturk.com). MTurk is an online portal where “requesters” post tasks (i.e.,
“HITs”) and “workers” or “turkers” choose and complete them for a specified amount of
money. MTurk has been used in many psychological research studies and provides easy
access to a large diverse population, often leading to faster collection of high-quality
psychometrically sound data (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason and Suri,
2012). Recruitment for MTurk is passive in that workers find a task by either browsing or
searching for keywords specified by the requester. For the proposed study, the
nondescript title: “Subliminal message study” along with the search terms: “psychology,
experiment,” and description: “Study examining the effects of subliminal messages on
cognitive performance.” was used. Workers who met the study's qualifications were able
to access a brief description of the study and contact the researcher for additional
information. The qualifications for the current study required prospective participants to
be from the United States, at least 18 years of age, and have a satisfactory task
completion rate (HIT Approval Rate) of 95% or higher on MTurk. Workers who chose to
participate in the study after reviewing the description were directed to a page with an
informed consent form, and only those who gave consent were sent to an online survey
(Qualtrics).
Recruitment was split up into five waves, each on different days and times of the
same week (all between 12pm and 10pm). This was done to maximize the
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representativeness of the sample in terms of domestic time zones and work hours.
Participation in the study took approximately 5-8 minutes to complete and each
participant was compensated $0.50.
At the end of the test, participants were asked to provide various demographic
information, including sex, age, race/ethnicity, highest level of education. Following the
test, participants were presented with an online debriefing form and were provided a
randomly generated survey completion code to submit to MTurk to ensure that they were
compensated for their participation. No further incentives were offered.

3.2 Materials & Procedure

3.2.1 Grammatical reasoning test (GRT). The test used in this study was a 64item test based on Baddeley's (1968) grammatical reasoning test (BGRT) with visual
elements added to accommodate the “subliminal cues” paradigm central to the current
study. The BGRT is a simple reasoning test that involves understanding and responding
to statements of varying levels of syntactic complexity. It is known for being short, easily
administered, and reliable (Baddeley, 1968). Performance correlates with intelligence
(+.59) and has proved to be sensitive to a number of stresses. It has been used to measure
the effect of nitrogen narcosis (an altered mental state akin to drunkenness that develops
when divers breathe compressed air at extreme depths) on divers’ ability to reason.
Notably, it was found that cognitive impairments were more pronounced when divers
were at sea compared to in a compression tank, suggesting sensitivity to increased stress
in response to "real world" circumstances (Baddeley & Flemming, 1967; Baddeley et al.,
1968).
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For each item of the GRT, participants were presented with a short statement,
(“A precedes B”) by one of two possible letter sequences: "AB" or "BA" (see Table 3).
For the statements in the GRT, please see Appendix B.
Participants were instructed to read each statement and evaluate whether it was
true (correct) or false (incorrect) in describing the letter sequence that followed. If the
statement described the letter sequence correctly, they were instructed to choose "TRUE".
If the statement described the letter sequence incorrectly, they were instructed to choose
"FALSE". Eight base statements (See Table 3) with four possible combinations each (i.e.,
A-B-AB, A-B-BA, B-A-AB, B-A-BA) produced a total of 32 unique statement and letter
sequence combinations.

Table 3
Grammatical Reasoning Test Statements
Statement
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

A/B
A/B
A/B
A/B
A/B
A/B
A/B
A/B

Follows
Precedes
is followed by
is preceded by
does not follow
does not precede
is not followed by
is not preceded by

Letter Sequence
A/B
A/B
A/B
A/B
A/B
A/B
A/B
A/B

→
→
→
→
→
→
→
→

AB / BA
AB / BA
AB / BA
AB / BA
AB / BA
AB / BA
AB / BA
AB / BA

To ensure that all test items remained consistent in overall appearance (height,
width, font, location, etc.) and compatible with all browsers, 32 animated GIF files were
created, one for each unique statement-letter sequence combination. During the test,
participants saw a rectangle in the center of their browser measuring 700px width by
210px height (size adapted to screen size to accommodate various devices). The test item
(a statement followed by an arrow which points to the letter pair) appeared in the center
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of the rectangle for 50 milliseconds, which was replaced by a rapidly changing string of
random characters filling the entire rectangle for 300 milliseconds, and then returned to
and remained on the initial test item. Under the rectangle were two answer choices of
"TRUE" and "FALSE" positioned side-by-side.
Below that on the right hand side was a button to proceed to the next test item.
Participants received detailed instructions and were asked to evaluate 6 sample
statements of varying difficulty. Incorrect answers prompted feedback of the correct
answer and a brief explanation. Participants were asked to ensure they had a minimum of
3 uninterrupted minutes before they proceeded to the next page and that the clock would
start immediately. They were informed that they would no longer receive feedback as to
whether their response was correct or incorrect. They were instructed to proceed when
ready and to work as quickly as possible without making mistakes.

Participants were instructed to choose an answer and click the button to proceed
to the next test item. Participants were presented with one item (statement-letter
sequence) at a time, and given 3 minutes to evaluate as many as possible.
Scoring. The BGRT was designed to be scored by adding up the number of
correct answers. Scores can range from 0 to 64. Total items correct was also used in the
analyses of the GRT in the current study as it has been traditionally considered the most
sensitive and commonly used measure of performance in analyses (Baddeley, A.D. 1968;
Carter, Kennedy, Bittner, Jr., 1981).
Procedures. Participants were recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk. For
example, the 90:10 group received the following information:
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“In this study, 90% of the participants (9 for every 10) will receive active
subliminal cues during a cognitive test. The other 10% of the participants (1 for every 10)
will receive placebo (inactive) subliminal cues. In other words, you have a 90% (9/10)
chance of receiving active subliminal cues and a 10% (1/10) chance of receiving placebo
(inactive) subliminal cues.“
Likewise, the 75:25, 50:50, 25:75, and 10:90 groups were informed that there
were 75%, 50%, 25%, and 10% chances of receiving "active" subliminal cues, and a
25%, 50%, 75%, and 90% chances of receiving placebo subliminal cues, respectively.
These prompts were accompanied by two graphical representations that consisted of: (1)
twenty human figures colored either green or gray based on the ratio/probability (e.g.,
10/90: 2 green, 18 gray), and (2) a pie chart colored in green and gray, indicating the
portion of participants that will receive the treatment versus the portion that will not (e.g.,
9/10 green and 1/10 gray). See Figure 2.

Figure 2. Graphical Disclosure of Randomization Ratio

Those assigned to the 100:0 group were informed that they were randomly
selected to receive only active subliminal cues during the cognitive test. Those assigned
to the Open Placebo (OP) group were informed that they were randomly selected to
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receive only placebo subliminal cues during the cognitive test and that the blocks of code
were made up of random strings of characters that had no evidence of being effective.
Those assigned to the No Treatment (NT) group proceeded directly to taking the test
without any mention of subliminal cues. They were informed that the block of flashing
code was an indicator that a randomizing algorithm was executing.
To discourage guessing, all participants were informed that even active subliminal
cues had not been shown to improve the success rate of guesses, and had only been
shown to enhance performance beyond one’s maximum effort.

3.2.2 Pre-Test Questionnaire (Expectation/Hope). All experimental conditions
were asked to indicate their chances of receiving active and placebo subliminal cues
using horizontal slidebars with values between 0 and 100. They were also asked to
indicate how likely they believed (7-point Likert scale assessing expectancy) and how
strongly they hoped (5-point Likert scale assessing hope) that the subliminal cues would
improve their performance, both active and subliminal. Wording for questions were
adjusted for each condition to be consistent with their randomization ratio.

3.2.3 Post-test questionnaire. All groups were asked to complete the post-test
questionnaire. They were asked to indicate what portion of their answers they were
confident about (GRT Confidence, 5-point Likert). As in the pre-test questionnaire, they
were again asked to indicate their chances of having received active and placebo
subliminal cues using horizontal slidebars with values between 0 and 100%
(Active/Placebo Probability Recall, 0-100%). They were asked whether they believed
they were assigned to active or placebo conditions (Treatment Assumption; 5-point
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Likert scale), and how confident they were about it (TA Confidence, 5-point Likert
scale). They were asked whether they believed the subliminal cues (active or placebo)
improved their test performance (Efficacy Confidence, 5-point Likert scale), and how
much (Efficacy Estimate, 5-point Likert scale).

3.2.4 Demographic questionnaire (and input methods). All conditions received
the demographic questionnaire. General demographic information such as gender, age,
race/ethnicity, and education were collected. The reason for collecting this data at the end
of the study, after the test, was to counter any potential stereotype threat.
Participants were also asked whether they considered themselves as bilingual or
multilingual and if English was their native language. In addition, they were asked
information about the electronic device they used to complete the study. Namely, the type
of device used (desktop/laptop, smartphone/tablet, other) and primary input method
(touchscreen, mouse/touchpad, physical keyboard, other). Information about device and
input method were used to ensure there were no group differences in speed (based on
device or input method). Respondents also had the opportunity to provide additional
comments/feedback. Device operating system, resolution, and browser information were
also collected.

3.2.5 Study completion. Following the demographic section, participants were
provided with a survey completion code. Participants were instructed to return to the
MTurk website (by closing the survey window) and enter the survey completion code to
complete the process.
3.3 Study Design and Analyses
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This study was a cross-sectional quantitative survey seeking to determine whether
there is a relationship between the likelihood of receiving an active treatment
(represented by the randomization ratio) and the placebo response. For the first analysis,
the independent variable was the Randomization Ratio (RR) and the dependent variable
was scores on the Grammatical Reasoning Test (GRT). The influence of RR on GRT
scores was tested using the Jonckheere-Terpstra Test. For the second analysis, the
independent variable was the RR and the dependent variable was items attempted on the
GRT. The influence of RR on GRT items attempted was tested using the JonckheereTerpstra Test. For the third analysis, the independent variable was the RR and the
dependent variable was post-test Treatment Assumption. The influence of RR on posttest Treatment Assumption (TA) was tested using a Chi-square goodness-of-fit Test. For
the fourth analysis, the independent variable was post-test Treatment Assumptions and
the dependent variable was GRT scores. The relationship between post-test Treatment
Assumptions and GRT scores was tested using an independent samples t-test. For the
fifth analysis, a binomial logistic regression analysis was used to ascertain the effects of
RR group, GRT score, GRT Items Attempted, Efficacy Expectation and Efficacy Hope
(for both active and placebo), GRT Confidence, Efficacy Confidence of Efficacy, and
Efficacy Estimate on reported Treatment Assumption. For the sixth analysis, a
hierarchical multiple regression was used to determine if the addition of RR group, active
Efficacy Expectation, placebo Efficacy Expectation, active Efficacy Hope, placebo
Efficacy Hope, Treatment Assumption, and Efficacy Confidence improved the prediction
of GRT score over and above Education alone. For the seventh and eighth analyses,
spearman correlations were used to detect any relationships between RR and expectation
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of and hope for efficacy, as well as between PR and expectation of and hope for efficacy
and the PR.
3.3.2 Power analysis. Power for this study was determined by the most sampleintensive analysis planned, the two-sided Jonckheere-Terpstra (J-T) test of GRT scores
(total correct items) by RR group. Analysis was conducted in R (with power.ladesign
function included in the clinfun package). Based on an alpha of .05, sample size estimates
indicated that the J-T test would be able to detect differences in groups with a sample size
of 118, based on estimated odds ratios of 1.02 (OP/NT), 1.03 (10:90/NT), 1.08
(25:75/NT), 1.17 (50:50/NT), 1.25 (75:25/NT), 1.3 (90:10/NT), 1.33 (100:0/NT) at a
power of .8. The rationale for the OR was that a third (.33) would be a clinically
significant difference between the two hypothesized extremes and the other values in
between were reached by multiplying .33 by the probability of receiving the active
treatment (e.g., .33 * .75 = .25) and adding it to 1. As no previous research was available
on which to base these odds ratio estimates, these estimates should be considered vague
approximations. 125 participants is a conservative estimate to detect a statistically
significant result.
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Chapter IV: Results
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether there is a relationship
between the likelihood of receiving an active treatment (represented by the randomization
ratio) and the placebo response (PR). The primary analyses consisted of those that
examined the relationships between: RR (randomization ratio) group, GRT (Grammatial
Reasoning Test) score, GRT items attempted, and Treatment Assumption. The study also
sought to explore the contribution of perception-related variables, including Efficacy
Expectation, Efficacy Hope, Efficacy Confidence, Efficacy Estimate, and their
relationships to variables included in the primary analyses. This chapter provides
demographic variable testing, results of hypothesis tests, and a summary of findings of
this study.

4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Of note, each RR group had a percentage of participants who provided an
incorrect RR after completing the GRT (see Table 4). Ratios that were more than 5%
greater or 5% less than the correct RR were considered incorrect. For example, for the
assigned RR of 75:25, the RRs reported as 70:30, 80:25, 70:25, or 75:20 would have all
been considered acceptable (even if they did not add up to 100). This 5% “buffer” was
implemented to minimize miscategorization of input error, especially on touch screens or
small monitors, as participants were asked to specify the RR percentages by dragging a
bar on a meter that horizontally spanned from 0 to 100 with a default value of 45. The
mean GRT scores for these participants, which are all lower than the means for their
respective RR groups are provided in the table below.
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Table 4
Incorrect RR Responses
RR
100:0
90:10
75:25
50:50
25:75
10:90
OP
NT

Count (%)
11 (8.8%)
24 (19.2%)
22 (17.6%)
22 (17.6%)
22 (17.6%)
24 (19.2%)
18 (14.4%)
NA

Average GRT Score
20.36
20.79
23.82
22.91
23.18
16.54
16.78
NA

4.2 Primary Analyses

4.2.1 Research question 1. Is there a relationship between the randomization
ratio and the magnitude of the placebo response? Hypothesis 1 predicted that there would
be a discernible relationship between the RR and PR, such that GRT scores would
increase with the increasing likelihood of receiving active treatment. A JonckheereTerpstra was conducted to determine if there was a monotonic trend in GRT scores based
on RR increasing or decreasing chance of receiving active treatment). Participants were
classified into eight groups: (1) 100:90 (n =125), (2) 90:10 (n =125), (3) 75:25 (n =125),
(4) 50:50 (n = 125), (5) 25:75 (n = 125), (6) 10:90 (n =125), (7) OP (n =125), and (8) NT
(n =125). Median GRT scores in the eight RR groups were 26 for the 100:0 group (n =
125), 24 for the 90:10 group (n = 125), 24 for the 75:25 group (n = 125), 24 for the 50:50
group (n = 125), 23 for the 25:75 group (n = 125), 22 for the 10:90 group (n = 125), 24
for the OP group (n = 125), and 23 for the NT group (n = 125). Distributions of GRT
scores were somewhat similarly-shaped for all groups, as assessed by visual inspection of
a histogram. It was hypothesized that there would be an increasing monotonic trend in
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GRT scores for increasing chances of receiving active treatment. A Jonckheere-Terpstra
test determined that there was a statistically significant increasing monotonic trend in
GRT scores, p = .033. The effect size, as measured by Kendall's τb (Kraska-Miller, 2014)
between RR groups and GRT scores, was -.049. Mean/median GRT scores by RR are
shown in Table 5.
Table 5
Items Correct
RR
100:0
90:10
75:25
50:50
25:75
10:90
OP
NT

Mean
25.06
24.74
24.36
23.94
23.65
23.29
23.66
22.87

Median
26
24
24
24
23
22
24
23

Std. Dev.
8.456
8.498
9.180
8.982
8.571
9.684
9.516
9.547

4.2.2 Research question 2. Is there a relationship between the randomization
ratio and GRT items attempted? Hypothesis 2 predicted that there would be a discernible
relationship between the RR and GRT items attempted, such that GRT items attempted
would increase with the increasing likelihood of receiving active treatment. A
Jonckheere-Terpstra was conducted to determine if there was a monotonic trend in GRT
items attempted based on RR (increasing or decreasing chance of receiving active
treatment). Median GRT items attempted in the eight RR groups were 31 for the 100:0
group (n = 125), 29 for the 90:10 group (n = 125), 30 for the 75:25 group (n = 125), 30
for the 50:50 group (n = 125), 29 for the 25:75 group (n = 125), 27 for the 10:90 group (n
= 125), 28 for the Open Placebo (OP) group (n = 125), and 27 for the No Treatment (NT)
group (n = 125). Distributions of GRT items attempted were somewhat similarly-shaped
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for all groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a histogram. It was hypothesized that
there would be an increasing monotonic trend in GRT items attempted for increasing
chances of receiving active treatment. A Jonckheere-Terpstra test determined that there
was a statistically significant increasing monotonic trend in GRT items attempted, p =
.019. The effect size, as measured by Kendall's τb (Kraska-Miller, 2014) between RR
groups and GRT items attempted, was -.086. Mean GRT items attempted by RR are
shown in Table 6. Figure 3 shows how GRT scores and items attempted appear to mirror
each other.
Table 6
Items Attempted
RR
100:0
90:10
75:25
50:50
25:75
10:90
OP
NT

Mean
29.72
29.45
29.26
28.88
28.67
28.28
28.33
27.84

Median
30
29
29
30
29
27
28
27

Std. Dev.
9.024
8.322
7.933
8.840
9.706
8.798
9.231
10.553
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Figure 3. GRT Performance by RR group

4.2.3 Research question 3. Is there a relationship between the Randomization
Ratio (RR) and post-test Treatment Assumption (TA)? Hypothesis 3 predicted that
participants assigned to RR conditions with higher likelihoods of receiving active
treatment would be more likely to report an active Treatment Assumption than
participants assigned to RR conditions with lower likelihoods. Of the 1,000 participants
recruited to the study, 625 of them were assigned to “open-chance” RR conditions
(90:10, 75:25, 50:50, 25:75, and 10:90) in which they were asked to specify the treatment
that they believed they had received after completing the GRT. Of them, 241 (38.6%)
believed that they had received active treatment while 384 (61.4%) believed they had
received placebo treatment. A chi-square goodness-of-fit test was conducted to determine
whether there was a relationship between assigned RR and Treatment Assumption (belief
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about which treatment they had received). Across groups, frequencies were significantly
different (from the expected counts of 48.2 active assumptions and 76.8 placebo
assumptions). The chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicated that the two Treatment
Assumptions (active or placebo) were not equally represented across RR groups (χ2(4) =
98.966, p < .001). As hypothesized, active Treatment Assumptions were more common
in RR groups with higher likelihood of receiving active treatment. Of note, the 50:50
group produced a close distribution to the expected counts (46 active Treatment
Assumptions and 79 placebo Treatment Assumptions) and the 75:25 group produced a
50-50 split. Figures 4 and 5 show the trend of Treatment Assumptions

Figure 4. Treatment Assumption by Randomization Ratio (Bar Graph)
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Figure 5. Treatment Assumption by Randomization Ratio (Line Graph)

4.2.4 Research question 4. Did GRT scores differ based on Treatment
Assumption? Hypothesis 4 predicted that GRT scores would be significantly higher
among participants who reported an active Treatment Assumption compared to those
who reported a placebo Treatment Assumption. An independent-samples T-test was
conducted to determine if GRT scores differed as a function of Treatment Assumption.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that participants who reported active Treatment Assumptions
(those who reported believing that they were assigned to active treatment following the
GRT) would have higher GRT scores than those who reported placebo Treatment
Assumptions (those who reported believing that they were assigned to placebo treatment
following the GRT).
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Among the 625 subjects in the five “open-chance” groups (90:10, 75:25, 50:50,
25:75, 10:90), there were 241 active and 384 placebo Treatment Assumptions. A Welch
t-test was run to determine if there were differences in GRT scores between active and
placebo Treatment Assumptions due to the assumption of homogeneity of variances
being violated, as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances (p = .043). There
were no outliers in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot, and GRT scores for
each level of Treatment Assumption were normally distributed, as assessed by visual
inspection of the Q-Q plots. There was a statistically significant difference in mean GRT
scores between active and placebo Treatment Assumptions, with placebo Treatment
Assumption GRT scores being higher than active Treatment Assumption GRT scores, M
= -2.40, 95% CI [-3.32 to -0.33], t(463.82) = -2.40, p = .017. This was true not just as a
whole but within all of the open-chance RR groups except for 75:25. See Table 7 for
mean GRT scores by Treatment Assumption and RR group.
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Table 7
Mean GRT Score by Treatment Assumption
Treatment

90:10

75:25

50:50

25:75

10:90

Active

24.15

25.10

21.33

18.84

17.24

Placebo

26.05

23.61

25.47

24.85

24.51

4.2.5 Research question 5. Which variables might have been involved in the
decision to choose one Treatment Assumption (active or placebo) over the other?
Hypothesis 5 predicted that the RR group, Efficacy Expectation, Efficacy Hope, and
GRT score would significantly predict participants’ Treatment Assumptions. A binomial
logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of RR group, GRT score, GRT
Items Attempted, Efficacy Expectation and Efficacy Hope (for both active and placebo),
GRT Confidence, Efficacy Confidence, and Efficacy Estimate on reported Treatment
Assumption. Linearity of the continuous variables with respect to the logit of the
dependent variable was assessed via the Box-Tidwell (1962) procedure. A Bonferroni
correction was applied using all fifteen terms in the model resulting in statistical
significance being accepted when p < .0033 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). Based on this
assessment, all continuous independent variables were found to be linearly related to the
logit of the dependent variable. There were no outliers. The logistic regression model was
statistically significant, χ2(14) =196.304, p < .0005. The model explained 36.6%
(Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in Treatment Assumptions and correctly classified
75.7% of cases. Sensitivity (true-positive for placebo Treatment Assumption) was 83.9%,
specificity (true-positive for active Treatment Assumption) was 62.7%, placebo
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Treatment Assumption predictive value was 78.2%, and active Treatment Assumption
predictive value was 62.7%. Of the fourteen predictor variables only six were statistically
significant: the RR groups and post-test Efficacy Estimate (as shown in Table 8). In
contrast to subjects in 90:10, those in 75:25 were 2.55 times more likely to report placebo
Treatment Assumption; those in 50:50 were 5.32 times more likely; those in 25:75 were
13.6 times more likely; and those in 10:90 were 17.2 times more likely. With each
additional level of post-test Efficacy Estimate, the likelihood of a placebo Treatment
Assumption was cut in half (.49).
Table 8
Logistic Regression
B

SE

Group

Wald

Df

P

95.813

4

.000

Odds Ratio

95% CI for OR
Lower

Upper

Group(1)

.934

.287

10.604

1

.001

2.545

1.450

4.466

Group(2)

1.672

.300

31.108

1

.000

5.321

2.957

9.575

Group(3)

2.610

.334

61.076

1

.000

13.600

7.067

26.170

Group(4)

2.845

.346

67.504

1

.000

17.202

8.726

33.909

Correct

.020

.023

.733

1

.392

1.020

.974

1.068

Attempted

.007

.021

.126

1

.722

1.007

.967

1.050

A-Expect

.070

.080

.784

1

.376

1.073

.918

1.256

A-Hope

.009

.105

.007

1

.934

1.009

.821

1.240

P-Expect

.034

.074

.207

1

.649

1.034

.894

1.196

P-Hope

.084

.099

.713

1

.399

1.087

.895

1.320

Confidence

-.013

.151

.007

1

.932

.987

.734

1.328

EfficacyConf

-.266

.162

2.714

1

.099

.766

.558

1.052

EfficacyEst

-.716

.168

18.139

1

.000

.489

.352

.680

TAConf

-.008

.087

.009

1

.924

.992

.837

1.176
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Constant

-.491

.715

.471

1

.493

.612
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4.2.6 Research question 6. Which variables best predicted GRT scores?
Hypothesis 6 predicted that after controlling for education, the RR group, Efficacy
Expectation, Treatment Assumption, and Efficacy Estimate would significantly predict
GRT scores. A hierarchical multiple regression was run to determine if the addition of
RR group, active Efficacy Expectation, placebo Efficacy Expectation, active Efficacy
Hope, placebo Efficacy Hope, Treatment Assumption, and Efficacy Confidence
improved the prediction of GRT score over and above Education alone. See Table 9 for
full details on each regression model.
There was linearity as assessed by partial regression plots and a plot of
studentized residuals against the predicted values. There was independence of residuals,
as assessed by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.033. There was homoscedasticity, as
assessed by visual inspection of a plot of studentized residuals versus unstandardized
predicted values. There was no evidence of multicollinearity, as assessed by tolerance
values greater than 0.1. There were no studentized deleted residuals greater than ±3
standard deviations, no leverage values greater than 0.2, and values for Cook's distance
above 1. The assumption of normality was met, as assessed by Q-Q Plot.
The full model of RR group, active Efficacy Expectation, placebo Efficacy
Expectation, active Efficacy Hope, placebo Efficacy Hope, Treatment Assumption, and
Efficacy Estimate to predict GRT score (Model 3) was statistically significant, R2 = .084,
F(7, 614) = 8.034, p = .013; adjusted R2 = .073. The addition of RR group to the
prediction of GRT score (Model 2) led to a non-significant increase in R2 of .004, F(1,
619) = 2.629, p = .105. The addition of active Efficacy Expectation, placebo Efficacy
Expectation, active Efficacy Hope, placebo Efficacy Hope, Treatment Assumption, and
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Efficacy Estimate to the prediction of GRT score (Model 3) also led to a statistically
significant increase in R2 of .070, F(5, 614) = 9.372, p < .001.

Table 9.
Summary of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis
GRT Score
Model 1
Model 2
Variable
B
Β
B
β
Constant
20.261**
--21.782**
--Education
0.583*
.099
.603*
.102
RR group
-----.412
-.065
Active Efficacy Expect.
--------Placebo Efficacy
--------Expect.
Active efficacy hope
--------Placebo efficacy hope
--------Treatment Assumption
--------R²
F
Δ R²
ΔF

.010
6.140*
.010
6.140*

---------

.014
4.393*
.004
2.629

---------

Model 3
B
Β
23.981**
--0.472*
.080
-0.662*
-.104
-0.156
-.027
-1.114*

-.213

.084
-.075
2.157*

.011
-.011
.117

.084
8.034*
.070
9.372*

---------

Note. N = 100. * p < .05; ** p < .001

4.2.7 Research question 7. Is there a relationship between RR and expectation of
and hope for efficacy? Hypothesis 7 predicted that there would be a positive correlation
between RR (odds of receiving active treatment) and pre-test Efficacy Expectation and
Efficacy Hope for active treatment but not placebo. A Spearman’s rank-order correlation
was used to examine the influence of RR on pre-test Efficacy Expectation and Efficacy
Hope (for both active and placebo treatments). Of the 1,000 participants recruited to the
study, 875 subjects (7 of the 8 groups; all except NT (No-Treatment) were asked to rate
their pre-test Efficacy Expectation and Efficacy Hope for either active or placebo
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treatments regarding their performance prior to the GRT. The “open-chance” groups were
asked for Efficacy Expectation and Efficacy Hope for both active and placebo treatments
(n=625); the 100:0 group was asked for active Efficacy Expectation and Efficacy Hope
(n=125); the OP (Open Placebo) group was asked for placebo Efficacy Expectation and
hope (n=125); and the NT group was not asked about Efficacy Expectation or hope
(n=125). Preliminary analysis showed the relationship to be monotonic, as assessed by
visual inspection of a scatterplot.
As hypothesized, there was a statistically significant, small positive correlation
between RR and pre-test active Efficacy Expectation, rs(750) = .164, p < .0005. There
was no statistically significant correlation between RR and pre-test active Efficacy Hope,
rs(750) = .07, p = .055. There were no significant correlations between RR and pre-test
placebo Efficacy Expectation or Efficacy Hope. This suggests that higher RR (perceived
likelihood of getting active treatment) may have led to higher pre-test active Efficacy
Expectation (that active treatment, if received, would improve performance). Mean
Efficacy Expectation and Efficacy Hope by RR group is shown in Table 10.
Table 10
Mean Efficacy Expectation and Efficacy Hope
RR Group

Active Efficacy
Expectation

Active Efficacy
Hope

Placebo Efficacy Placebo Efficacy
Expectation
Hope

100:0

4.736

---

3.416

---

90:10

4.392

2.672

3.352

2.344

75:25

4.28

3.144

3.296

2.488

50:50

4.136

3.104

3.128

2.296

25:75

4.032

2.808

3.144

2.432

10:90

3.84

3.048

3.232

2.408
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OP

---

3.168

---

2.328

NT

---

---

---

---

4.2.8 Research question 8. Is there a relationship between expectation of and
hope for efficacy and the PR? Hypothesis 8 predicted that there would be a positive
correlation between GRT score and pre-test Efficacy Expectation and Efficacy Hope for
active treatment but not placebo. Contrary to the hypothesis, there was a statistically
significant, small negative correlation between GRT score and pre-test active Efficacy
Expectation, rs(750) = -.083, p =.022. The correlation between GRT score and pre-test
active Efficacy Hope was not significant, rs(750) = -.053, p = .150. There was a
statistically significant, small-medium negative correlation between GRT score and pretest placebo Efficacy Expectation, rs(750) = -.234, p < .0005. There was also a
statistically significant, small negative correlation between GRT score and pre-test
placebo Efficacy Hope, rs(750) = -.102, p = .005. This suggests that those who reported
less Efficacy Expectation and Efficacy Hope for active or placebo treatments obtained
higher GRT scores (consistent with findings during testing Hypothesis 4), and that
Efficacy Expectation had a stronger relationship than Efficacy Hope.

4.3 Conclusion
The results of this study provides support for a discernable relationship between
the randomization ratio (RR) and the placebo response (PR). The paradigm was
successful in eliciting and detecting a relationship between the randomization ratio and
the magnitude of the placebo response, such that GRT scores increased with the
increasing probability of receiving active treatment (Hypothesis 1). A similar increasing
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monotonic trend was observed between the RR and the number of GRT items attempted
(Hypothesis 2), suggesting that increased speed (more items being attempted) may have
contributed to the increasing trend in GRT scores. Examination of “open-chance” groups
found that subjects assigned to RR conditions with higher likelihood of receiving active
treatment were more likely to report an active Treatment Assumption (belief that they
had received active treatment) than those assigned to RR conditions with lower likelihood
of receiving active treatment (Hypothesis 3). Overall, there was a placebo bias in the
study with placebo Treatment Assumptions outnumbering active Treatment Assumptions,
61% to 39%. As predicted, GRT scores differed as a function of Treatment Assumption
(Hypothesis 4), but in the opposite direction as hypothesized. That is, those who reported
placebo Treatment Assumptions obtained significantly higher scores than those who
reported active Treatment Assumptions. In terms of predictors of Treatment Assumption
(Hypothesis 5), the logistic regression model was statistically significant and among the
factors examined, RR group and Efficacy Estimate were the two significant predictors.
The model explained 36.6% of the variance in Treatment Assumptions and correctly
classified 75.7% of cases. In terms of predictors of GRT score (Hypothesis 6), a
hierarchical multiple regression model was statistically significant and found that the
addition of RR group, placebo Efficacy Expectation, and Treatment Assumption added
significantly to the prediction of GRT score, after controlling for education.
As hypothesized, there was a positive correlation between RR (odds of receiving
active treatment) and pre-test active Efficacy Expectation but not Efficacy Hope. As
predicted, there were no significant correlations between RR and pre-test placebo
Efficacy Expectation or placebo Efficacy Hope. This suggests that higher RR (perceived

98

Getting the Benefit of the Doubt

likelihood of receiving active treatment) may have led to higher pre-test expectation that
active treatment (if received) would improve performance (Hypothesis 7).
Efficacy Expectations for both active and placebo treatments and Efficacy Hope
for placebo treatment were significantly negatively correlated with GRT scores
(Hypothesis 8). Together, these findings suggest that those who were less optimistic
about Treatment Efficacy tended to obtain higher GRT scores. Possible reasons for this
are explored in the Discussion section.
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Chapter V: Discussion
A randomized controlled trial (RCT) is a type of experimental design in which
subjects are randomly assigned to two or more conditions where there is at least one
experimental treatment to be evaluated and at least one control condition. Randomized
controlled trials are considered the “gold standard” in research because – when they are
designed correctly – it provides the strongest possible evidence of causation (Hulley,
Cummings, Browner, & Grady, 2007). The control condition in RCTs usually consist of:
(1) a no-treatment control condition, in which no treatment is received, or (2) a placebo
control condition, in which participants are led to believe they are receiving an active
treatment when they are not or (3) a positive control condition (when the treatment being
evaluated is a new treatment which is being compared to the control (which in this case is
an already proven treatment for the same condition).
Placebos are inert treatments to which an experimental (active) treatment can be
compared against to control treatment for changes associated with the belief that one is
receiving treatment. The placebo effect has been defined as consisting of “measurable
psychological, biological, and behavioral changes that result from expectations that a
treatment will be effective” (Colloca, Jonas, Killen, Miller & Shurtleff, 2014, p. 124).
Placebos, which were originally a type of control condition consisting of inert treatments
to which experimental (active) treatments were compared for placebo effects (the
changes associated with the belief that one is receiving treatment), has now become the
focus of researchers. In lieu of evidence that placebos can be just as, if not more effective
than their active counterparts for the treatment of some conditions and over time, the
placebo effect (or placebo response, PR) has come to be regarded by many academic
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researchers as an inevitable component of research and a crucial component in
healthcare.
Unfortunately, the literature and our understanding of placebo effects has been
limited due to: (1) a lack of experiments designed specifically for evaluating variables
that contribute to placebo effects, (2) a majority of the literature consists mainly of metaanalyses where most of the data are “pieced together” from unrelated studies with
different designs, populations, and different ways in which study participants were
informed of the probability/ratio of receiving an active treatments or inactive treatments
(placebo) for a condition, (3) experiments on testing the assumption of having received
different treatment ratios (randomization ratios, RR) were severely limited, to the
knowledge of this author, with the exception of the Lidstone et al. (2010) study in which
participants were randomly assigned to different treatment (randomization ratio)
conditions (4) there were no manipulation checks described in the aforementioned
previous studies, (5) lack of open placebo (OP) conditions in which participants are
informed that they will be receiving a placebo.
This study sought to address the limitations of the current literature by (1) having
been designed specifically to further our understanding of placebo effects and how the
differences in treatment allocations (randomization ratios) may contribute to the possible
development of placebo effects, (2) informing all the study participants of their treatment
allocation ratio (RR), (3) investigating whether there was any relationship between the
different treatment allocation ratios (RR) and their performance (placebo response; PR),
(4) including a manipulation check to assess whether the participants were able to
confirm the specific (treatment allocation or randomization ratio) group to which they
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were assigned, and (5) including an open placebo condition in which participants were
openly informed of receiving a placebo and (6) as this study was conducted entirely
online, it eliminated the variable of having to account for the role that provider
interaction between the clinician and the patient (some researchers have pointed out the
relationship with the may have contributed to the participants’ performance on the simple
cognitive test (Grammatical Reasoning Test; GRT).
In this study, participants took the GRT online through the Amazon MTurk
platform to investigate whether there was a relationship between the randomization ratio
(RR) and the placebo response. The first research question examined whether there exists
a relationship between the randomization ratio and the magnitude of the placebo
response. Hypothesis 1 predicted that there was a relationship, such that higher
likelihoods of receiving active treatment would result in larger placebo responses while
lower likelihoods would result in smaller placebo responses. Restated, it was
hypothesized that GRT scores would increase with the increasing probability of receiving
active treatment across the eight varying randomization ratios as the likelihood of
receiving active treatment increased and placebo treatment decreased. Results found this
to be the case, detecting an increasing monotonic trend in GRT scores, with the 100:0
group having the highest GRT scores and the NT group having the lowest, with 90:10,
75:25, 50:50, OP, 25:75, and 10:90 falling in between, in that order. The OP group
outperformed NT as expected, consistent with previous open placebo studies, such as
Kaptchuk, et al. (2010) and Park and Covi (1965). That it also outperformed 10:90 and
25:75 was somewhat unexpected. It is important to note however that the group
differences established in the current study were order-dependent (i.e., Jonckheere-
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Terpstra Test) and lacked the power to detect significant group differences independent
of order, especially given the small effect size (-.05). This was confirmed in pairwise
post-hoc procedures for the J-T test that did not find significant differences between any
of the groups.
The second research question examined whether a similar relationship existed
between the RR and GRT items attempted. Hypothesis 2 predicted that the same
increasing monotonic trend would be seen in the total number of items attempted. Results
revealed a similar increasing monotonic trend in the number of GRT items attempted.
Since the GRT scores consisted of total items correct, participants who simply attempted
a greater number of questions had a higher chance of obtaining a higher score. That a
similar trend was observed in both GRT scores and GRT items attempted may suggest
that the placebo effect in the current study may be a function of increased speed (more
items being attempted). However, it is still possible that accuracy was also impacted as
the placebo response has been observed in academic tests that reach scores by subtracting
the number of incorrect answers from the correct (e.g., Weger and Loughnan, 2013).
The third research question examined whether there was a relationship between
the RR and the division of treatment assumptions among the “open-chance” groups.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that participants assigned to RR conditions with higher
likelihoods of receiving active treatment were more likely to report active Treatment
Assumptions following the test. As hypothesized, active Treatment Assumptions were
more common in RR groups with higher likelihood of receiving active treatment than in
those with lower likelihoods. However, there was an overall placebo bias across groups
as 61% (384) reported a placebo Treatment Assumption while 39% (241) reported an
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active Treatment Assumption. Of note, the 50:50 group produced a close distribution to
the expected counts of 48.2 active Treatment Assumptions and 76.8 placebo Treatment
Assumptions (46 active Treatment Assumptions and 79 placebo Treatment Assumptions)
and the 75:25 group produced a 50-50 split (63 active and 62 placebo). Additionally, the
75:25 group was also the only one in which the mean GRT score of subjects reporting
active Treatment Assumptions was higher than that of subjects reporting placebo
Treatment Assumptions. Although likely a coincidence, the RR study with Parkinson’s
disease patients by Lidstone et al. (2010) found that their 75:25 group led to maximal
placebo response. This was not the case in the current study but the 75:25 group was
unique in the ways described.
The fourth research question examined whether there was a relationship between
Treatment Assumptions and GRT scores among open-chance groups. Hypothesis 4
predicted that those who reported an active Treatment Assumption would have higher
GRT scores than those who reported placebo Treatment Assumption. Results suggested
the exact opposite—that GRT scores were significantly higher for those who reported a
placebo TA rather than active TA. This was true not just as a whole but within all of the
RR groups except for 75:25. Although counterintuitive, there are many possible
explanations for this finding.
First, participants were asked for their Treatment Assumption only after the GRT.
This was because it was believed that asking about Treatment Assumptions prior to the
GRT could raise suspicion and compromise the study design. However, asking for
Treatment Assumption following the GRT poses obvious limitations since many of the
participants may have altered their initial assumption during and/or following the GRT

104

Getting the Benefit of the Doubt

based on their self-assessed performance. Given the relative ease of the GRT, it is
possible that many participants concluded that their performance was entirely their own.
It is also important to keep in mind that Treatment Assumptions are not static
beliefs/states and may be prone to changing at any point in a study, from item to item or
even moment to moment.
In the current study, participants were more likely to report a placebo Treatment
Assumption than active Treatment Assumption. To the author’s best knowledge, this was
the only study in which Treatment Assumptions were taken into account and thus it is
unclear as to whether this was specific to this study or a pattern that could be observed
cross many studies that employ placebos. Elements of the self-serving bias may have
contributed to this difference. The self-service bias posits that individuals tend to ascribe
success to their own abilities and efforts, and ascribe failure to external factors. This is
consistent with the findings of a literature review by Horing, Weimer, and Enck (2014)
which found emotional valence (i.e. self esteem, self efficacy, locus of control and
optimism) related cognitive constructs to predict placebo responsiveness. Thus, those
who believed they performed well may have been less likely to “give credit” to external
circumstances (i.e., active treatment), thereby increasing the likelihood of reporting a
placebo Treatment Assumption. Those who exerted greater effort and/or performed better
may be more inclined to believe that their performance was entirely attributed to their
own abilities (thus reporting their belief that they received placebo). The results may have
been vastly different had the question been posed prior to the test (See Appendix ).
Furthermore, given that the GRT was described as a “cognitive test,” performance may
have become tied to beliefs about one’s own intelligence and self-esteem. Had the GRT
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been framed as a “game” or “challenge” that appeared less directly linked to intelligence,
participants may have been more likely to report an active Treatment Assumption. .
Thirdly, subjects with greater skepticism towards the study design (and thus more
likely to report placebo Treatment Assumptions) may have simply performed better. This
could be due to differences in factors such as effort, attention, or cognitive ability. It may
also be the case that these subjects were evaluating information with a critical stance,
which is the term used to define the ability to critically think and weigh the information at
hand while being prepared to doubt when necessary (Mills, 2013, p. 404). Participants
who evaluate information with a critical stance and are more selectively skeptical (the
ability to determine whether doubt may be more appropriate than trust towards new
information) may have led to dismissal of the deception in the current study (Mills, 2013,
p. 414). The weak negative correlation between GRT scores and pre-test expectation of
benefit (Active and Placebo Efficacy Expectation) may lend support to the critical stance
and skepticism toward information explanation. Education was not significantly different
between Treatment Assumption groups, however.
Finally, Kaptchuk (2018), a leading researcher in the field of placebo effect,
proposes a biomedical standpoint where placebo effects are neurologically encoded
predictions and may occur automatically similar to the brain-gut connections, such as in
Pavlov’s experiment with the saliva reaction to the bell sound (p. 316). In contrast to his
previous placebo studies, Kaptchuk (2018) discusses how the current theories of
expectation and conditioning to explain placebo effects may be either insufficient or
inaccurate as the mechanisms behind placebo responses is “primarily elicited by what
you do and only secondarily or not at all - by what you think” (p. 328). He now proposes
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a down up perspective of placebo responses (especially in the case of open label
placebos), where placebo responses may stem from a biological (neurological) event, and
not a result of conscious interaction between the mind and the body (Kaptchuk, 2018, p.
19)
The fifth research question examined which variables might have been involved
in the decision to believe either that one is receiving active treatment or that one is
receiving a placebo. Hypothesis 5 predicted that RR group and GRT score were the
variables that best predicted their Treatment Assumption (TA). The logistic regression
model was statistically significant and it explained 36.6% of the variance in Treatment
Assumptions and correctly classified 75.7% of cases. Sensitivity (true-positive for
placebo TA) was 83.9%, specificity (true-positive for active TA) was 62.7%, placebo
Treatment Assumption’s predictive value was 78.2%, and active Treatment Assumption’s
predictive value was 62.7%. Of the fourteen predictor variables only six were statistically
significant: the RR groups and post-test estimate of efficacy. In contrast to subjects in
90:10, those in 75:25 were 2.55 times more likely to report placebo Treatment
Assumption; those in 50:50 were 5.32 times more likely; those in 25:75 were 13.6 times
more likely; and those in 10:90 were 17.2 times more likely. With each additional level
of post-test Efficacy Estimate, the likelihood of a placebo TA was cut in half (.49). Since
the model accounted for only 36.6% of the variance in treatment assumptions, much
remains unknown about what other factors are involved in the subjects’ decision-making
process. A large part may have been the overall optimism/pessimism regarding the study.
The sixth research question examined which variables might predict GRT scores
after controlling for education. Hypothesis 6 predicted that the variables of RR group,
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active Efficacy Expectation, placebo Efficacy Expectation, Treatment Assumption, and
Efficacy Estimate would significantly predict GRT scores after controlling for education.
The addition of RR group alone did not add significantly to the prediction of GRT score
(over education), but the addition of RR group, placebo Efficacy Expectation, and
Treatment Assumption did add significantly to the prediction of GRT score. It was
expected that Treatment Assumption would add significantly to the prediction of GRT
scores given the findings for Hypothesis 4 (placebo Treatment Assumption and higher
GRT scores). It is unknown why placebo Efficacy Expectation added significantly to the
prediction. Also consistent with the findings for Hypothesis 4, placebo Efficacy
Expectation might have added significantly to the prediction of GRT scores because
participants with greater skepticism (and thus more likely to report lower placebo
Efficacy Expectations) may have simply performed better.
The seventh research question examined whether there was a relationship between
RR and expectation of and hope for efficacy. Hypothesis 7 predicted that there is a
positive correlation between RR (odds of receiving active treatment) and pre-test
Efficacy Expectation and hope regarding active treatment but not placebo. As
hypothesized, there was a statistically significant, small positive correlation between RR
and pre-test Active Efficacy Expectation but not between RR and pre-test Active Efficacy
Hope. There were no significant correlations between RR and pre-test Placebo Efficacy
Expectation or Placebo Efficacy Hope. This suggests that higher RR (perceived
likelihood of getting active treatment) may have led to higher pre-test Efficacy
Expectation (that Active treatment, if received, would improve performance).
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As alluded to earlier, the fact that an event is more likely is known to also change
how people think about it. Construal level theory (CLT; Trope & Liberman, 2010) argues
that the psychological distance between a person and an event will affect the level at
which the person processes the event. According to CLT, those who perceive an event as
more likely will tend to focus on “lower” or more concrete details (e.g., specific symptom
changes) while those who perceive it as unlikely will tend to process it on a “higher” or
more abstract level (e.g., whether they feel better, generally). Thus, higher randomization
ratios may influence subjects into paying greater attention to detail, and lead to higher
sensitivity to subtle changes. This also makes sense when viewed through the lens of
Mere Ownership Effect, which refers to the tendency to evaluate objects they own more
favorably merely due to ownership (Beggan, 2007, p. 558). It may be construed that
when participants implicitly reasoned that they might as well expect benefits, it increased
their hope for greater benefits from the treatment that they were more likely to receive.
The eighth research question examined whether there was a relationship between
expectation of and hope for efficacy and the PR. Hypothesis 8 predicted that there would
be a positive correlation between GRT score and pre-test Efficacy Expectation and
Efficacy Hope for active treatment but not placebo. Contrary to the hypothesis, there was
a statistically significant, small negative correlation between GRT score and pre-test
Active Efficacy Expectation, while the correlation between GRT score and pre-test
Active Efficacy Hope was not significant. There was a statistically significant, smallmedium negative correlation between GRT score and pre-test Placebo Efficacy
Expectation, and a significant, small negative correlation between GRT score and pre-test
Placebo Efficacy Hope. This suggests that those who reported less expectation and hope

109

Getting the Benefit of the Doubt

for efficacy of active or placebo treatments obtained higher GRT scores, and that
expectation had a stronger relationship than hope.
In sum, those with greater expectation of and hope for efficacy before the GRT,
went on to obtain lower scores on the GRT, and greater Treatment Assumption Efficacy
Estimate after the test (than those with less expectation of and hope for efficacy before
the GRT). This could suggest that those with higher scores were more likely to be
pessimistic/skeptical about treatment efficacy before the test were less likely to believe
they benefited from treatment. An alternative hypothesis is that increased optimism about
treatment efficacy led to a reduction in effort.

5.2 Clinical and Practical Implications
To the investigator’s knowledge, this was the first study of its kind that was
designed to elicit and detect a trend in placebo responding across a range of
randomization ratios with a healthy population sample.
This study demonstrated that a monotonic trend can exist between the likelihood
of receiving active treatment and the placebo response. It suggests that when placebo
treatments are used to determine efficacy of target treatments, an unbalanced RR could
impact the PR. Typically, an unbalanced RR suggests that there are more active
treatments than placebo. This means that subjects who become aware of a higher
likelihood of receiving an active treatment may demonstrate a greater placebo response.
This could lead to insignificant findings in unbalanced trials – because placebo response
will be greater – and as such promising treatments may not appear to do any better than
placebo treatments. This is a legitimate concern even with balanced RR but the risk may
be far greater with unbalanced RR. The very small effect sizes observed in the current
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study should not have any bearing on the relevance of the findings considering that the
placebo response is a largely methodologically-driven phenomenon, and the magnitude
of the PR may be unique to each study design, if not each study.
Although the 1:1 ratio has long been regarded as the gold standard and is
considered to result in the maximum active-placebo difference, an increasing number of
studies have begun employing unequal randomization ratios (Hey & Kimmelman, 2014).
This decision is not always at the discretion of the researcher. The main rationale for such
studies include: (1) research sponsors’ desire to conserve resources and speed trials by
adding more treatment arms, and (2) aspirations to follow the clinical research ethics
code that requires minimizing the total burden on study subjects, interpreted as assigning
as few subjects as possible to placebo conditions (since it deprives them of active
treatment).
Results of this study suggest that the traditional RR of 1:1 may be the most
neutral to use in studies, especially when the potential for harm of receiving placebo is
small and the separation between active and placebo conditions are expected to be small.
The randomization ratio should be altered pending the objective of the study. If the main
objective is to elicit a lot of placebo response, then the randomization ratio should be
unbalanced in favor of active or positive conditions.
Similarly, Papakostas and Fava (2009) suggested that if a study participant’s
expectation of improvement was modified and the randomization probability of patients
receiving placebo was increased, this would likely result in an enhanced ability to
evaluate the changes due to the treatment effect (p. 38). Reasons notwithstanding, when
participants are explicitly informed of the randomization ratios, some of these unbalanced
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studies have produced unexpected results. It has been hypothesized that the lower odds of
being assigned to the placebo condition, which typically but not always implies a higher
probability of receiving active treatment, increases expectations of symptom change and
results in greater response to both active and placebo treatments (Weimer, Colloca, &
Enck, 2015). However, since placebo tends to benefit more from this uncertainty than
active treatments, the result is a smaller active-placebo difference (Sinyor et al., 2010),
which can lead to efficacious experimental treatments falling short of statistical
significance.
Furthermore, the impact of understanding the relationship between RR and PR is
not limited to research designs. Greater insight into the placebo response lends greater
insight into a broader phenomenon of the self-fulfilling prophecy. The placebo response
can be considered one form of self-fulfilling prophecy. Individuals anticipate an outcome,
and that anticipation raises the probability of that outcome.

5.3 Limitations
There are several notable limitations to the study, which should be noted. The
small effect size of the placebo effect observed in the study could be considered clinically
insignificant if examined by itself. However, the effect size for the trend of placebo
response observed across randomization ratio (RR) groups in the current study (Kendall’s
Tau following the Jonckheere-Terpstra test) is likely much smaller than in more typical
trials. This may be because of: (1) the online-testing paradigm, (2) simplicity of the test
(See Appendix B), (3) healthy population, and (4) the level of plausibility. In fact, past
research has shown that placebo effect sizes in more typical randomized controlled trials
can be large (Cochrane, 1972).
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The current online-testing paradigm, specifically designed to eliminate as many
confounding variables as possible and isolate expectation-based PR, does not offer the
same powerful placebogenic “ingredients” common in most clinical trials. In particular,
the current study does not have the additive element of conditioning common among
medical/pharmacological trials (e.g., pills, injections, procedures, etc.). Additionally,
remote participation in the study that eliminated social contact variables may have
increased the potential for a host of other variables such as inattentiveness, distraction,
and decreased motivation. The simplicity of the test, that made it easy to learn and
provide a relatively level playing field (by minimizing the effects of education), may
have also led to a ceiling effect in terms of observable effect size. Finally, the current
study sought to manipulate study the placebo effect with a population that was assumed
to be largely healthy. While it was important for the current study to remove confounding
health conditions to better control for potential impact to cognitive abilities and isolate
expectation-based PR, the resulting population may have been atypically typical for most
treatment-based placebo-controlled studies.
As with anything that is based on expectation, plausibility and perceived
legitimacy is critical. Placebo claims that are extraordinary may be deemed implausible
and dismissed as being “too good to be true” (Kirsch & Weixel, 1988). Hardman,
Geraghty, Howick, Roberts, and Bishop (2019) conducted a study on public perspectives
on placebos and their effects by collecting and analyzing online data (comments from
internet users) from articles written by news organizations in the UK, which were
responding to a study by Howick et al. (2013) on the use of placebos by general
practitioners in the United Kingdom. Hardman and his colleagues (2019) noted that
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commentators often advocated for a pejorative perspective of placebos. Of course,
plausibility is subjective and what is plausible to one individual may not be to another. So
how plausible were the claims in the current study? Although the significant trend across
groups suggests that there was at least sufficient “buy in” to reach statistical conclusions,
the extent to which the results might have been “diluted” by skepticism is unclear.
Perhaps telling is the heavily placebo-biased distribution of treatment assumptions and
low efficacy confidence and efficacy estimates. However, because opinions regarding the
study design were not explicitly assessed, it is impossible to determine whether the skew
towards placebo assumptions was due to population-wide pessimism reflective of
genuine belief of having received placebo. It may be that the public’s perception on
placebo may resemble their belief in subliminal messaging in advertisements. Results
from a study by Rogers and Smith (1993) which conducted telephone surveys to
determine the extent to which the public are aware of subliminal advertisements and how
influential the respondents believed it affected individual behaviors and attitudes
indicated that 74.3% of study participants reported awareness of subliminal advertising
and 72.2% indicated that subliminal messages were effective. However in the case of
public perceptions of placebo, there is the extra element of the implementation of
deception in some placebo studies and the attitudes towards it by (both the public and
researchers in the field) that should be taken into consideration. The skew towards
placebo could also be attributed to an indirect way of indicating skepticism with the study
design. There was a comment field following the demographic questionnaire and it was
notable in that among dozens of comments received, not one questioned the study design.
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In fact, the vast majority were comments expressed fascination with the study design
and/or how much they enjoyed participation.
There were some of the more definitive improvements that could have been
addressed in the current study. For example, asking for Treatment Assumption before the
GRT. Although treatment assumptions are not static constructs and may be prone to
changing at any point, even from item to item, having data at two critical points (before
and after the GRT) would have provided valuable insight. Another addition would have
been to collect data on pre-test confidence levels (following the sample items). This could
have assessed confidence not yet biased by self-assessed test performance. Another
modification would have been to use different frames for the GRT (e.g.,” challenge” or
“game” instead of “cognitive test”), thereby increasing distance from socially desirable
traits such as intelligence or cognitive ability.

5.4 Future Directions
The current study examined 8 conditions with varying levels of randomization
ratios and detected a trend across groups. This raises the question: What about other
theoretical randomization ratios such as 95:5, 80:20, or 1:99? Would there be a difference
between 100% and 99%, and if so, would that 1% difference result in a greater difference
than between 98% and 99%? Further studies in the perception of probability may find
that the perceived likelihood of receiving an active treatment does not change
significantly between certain RRs (e.g., a step function). For example, 75:25 may lead to
no greater PR than 80:20 or 70:30. It may be that there is some form of “Just appreciable
difference” in the perception of percentages at which it makes a difference in the minds
of participants. In fact, ratios that are cumbersome, such as 78:22, may end up fairing
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worse than a conceptually “cleaner” ratio like 75:25. Individual differences (e.g., traits
such as optimism), cultural background, and circumstances (how much a treatment is
needed, the risks involved, etc.) are likely to matter.
As mentioned previously, there have been uses of randomization ratios in
Parkinson’s disease patients structured in a way to maximize benefits and minimize side
effects. For people who develop conditions such as anticipatory nausea and vomiting
(ANV) or chemotherapy induced nausea (CINV) that are unresponsive to traditional antinausea, anti-vomiting medications and are instead best treated with behavioral treatment
or psychotropic medications (Kamen et al., 2014). .In addition, patients who have chronic
conditions (Parkinson’s, cancer, etc.) for which there are a lack of alternatives, those
circumstances may increase their motivation to receiving varying probability treatments.
Further examination may reveal that “randomization ratios” can serve as an additional
variable in such treatments.

Further studies into the decision making process involved in treatment
assumptions may warrant closer examination as well. In the current study, participants
were more likely to report a placebo treatment assumption. Was this suggestive of
skepticism towards the study design, a general pessimism bias and tendency to genuinely
assume placebo treatment, a combination of both, or something completely unrelated?
Under what circumstances are participants more likely to report active or placebo
treatment assumptions? At what point do participants reach a decision as to which
condition they are in? Does it change throughout the study? Would the amount of
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incentives or rewards affect the placebo response? Findings could be important in
designing future studies.
The current study assumed that providing varying ratios/probabilities would allow
participants to use their “internal randomization” mechanisms, but can we as humans
even choose randomly between options based on provided probabilities? For example,
are we able to make true 50-50 guesses? Coin flip studies suggest that people have
difficulty with even this simple RR and are more likely to choose the first option
presented (e.g., “heads or tails”), even when asked in colors (e.g., “blue or red”). One
recent study concluded that humans are capable of generating random numbers. In that
study, they were not given a range to pick from, however. There are studies that appear to
suggest that people may not be able to generate random numbers when given limited
choices.
For reasons discussed in the Limitations section, the effect size for the trend of
placebo response observed across RR groups in the current study (Kendall’s Tau
following the Jonckheere-Terpstra test) is likely much smaller than in more typical trials.
Future research will be able to uncover what sort of effect sizes might be observed in a
similar trials that employs placebo pills or injections. The potential for larger effect sizes
would allow for finer examination of the RR-PR link.
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Chapter VI: Appendices
Appendix A: Pre-Test Instructions
In the following test there are a number of short statements, each followed by one of two
possible letter sequences: “AB” or “BA”. The statements may or may not be correct in
describing the order of the two letters. For example, the letter sequence “AB” can be
correctly described in four different ways:
1.
2.
3.
4.

A precedes B
B follows A
B does not precede A
A does not follow B

All of the above statements are correct descriptions for the letter sequence “AB” and
incorrect descriptions for the letter sequence, “BA.”
Your job is to read each statement and evaluate whether it is true (correct) or false
(incorrect) in describing the letter sequence that follows. If the statement describes the
letter sequence correctly, choose "True.” If the statement describes the letter pair
incorrectly, choose "False."
This is illustrated in the following examples:
● A follows B → BA

(T)

F

● B precedes A → AB

T

(F)

● A is followed by B → AB

T

F

● B is not followed by A → BA

T

F

● B is preceded by A → BA

T

F

Try the following examples:
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● A does not precede B → BA

T

F

For the actual test, work as quickly as possible without making mistakes. Points will be
deducted for mistakes. You will have 5 minutes to evaluate as many statements as
possible.
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Appendix B: Grammatical Reasoning Test (GRT)
Statement

Answer

1

B precedes A → BA

T

F

2

A does not follow B → BA

T

F

3

A is preceded by B → AB

T

F

4

A is not followed by B → AB

T

F

5

B does not precede A → AB

T

F

6

B does not precede A → BA

T

F

7

A does not follow B → AB

T

F

8

B is preceded by A → AB

T

F

9

B is not preceded by A → AB

T

F

10

B follows A → AB

T

F

11

B is preceded by A → BA

T

F

12

A follows B → AB

T

F

13

B does not follow A → AB

T

F

14

B does not follow A → BA

T

F

15

A is followed by B → BA

T

F

16

B is not preceded by A → BA

T

F

17

A precedes B → AB

T

F

18

A is followed by B → AB

T

F

19

A precedes B → BA

T

F

20

B follows A → BA

T

F

21

A does not precede B → BA

T

F

22

A is preceded by B → BA

T

F

23

A is not followed by B → BA

T

F

24

B is followed by A → AB

T

F

25

A does not precede B → AB

T

F

26

A is not preceded by B → AB

T

F

27

B is followed by A → BA

T

F

28

B is not followed by A → AB

T

F

29

A is not preceded by B → BA

T

F

30

B is not followed by A → BA

T

F

31

A follows B → BA

T

F

32

B precedes A → AB

T

F

33

B is not followed by A → AB

T

F

34

A does not follow B → BA

T

F

35

A does not follow B → AB

T

F

36

B does not follow A → BA

T

F
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37

B does not precede A → AB

T

F

38

A is followed by B → BA

T

F

39

B follows A → BA

T

F

40

B is followed by A → BA

T

F

41

B is preceded by A → BA

T

F

42

B is not followed by A → BA

T

F

43

A is not preceded by B → BA

T

F

44

B does not follow A → AB

T

F

45

A is preceded by B → BA

T

F

46

A is not followed by B → AB

T

F

47

B precedes A → BA

T

F

48

B is preceded by A → AB

T

F

49

A is preceded by B → AB

T

F

50

A is not preceded by B → AB

T

F

51

A does not precede B → BA

T

F

52

A follows B → AB

T

F

53

A is not followed by B → BA

T

F

54

A precedes B → BA

T

F

55

B is not preceded by A → AB

T

F

56

A precedes B → AB

T

F

57

A does not precede B → AB

T

F

58

B precedes A → AB

T

F

59

A follows B → BA

T

F

60

A is followed by B → AB

T

F

61

B follows A → AB

T

F

62

B does not precede A → BA

T

F

63

B is not preceded by A → BA

T

F

64

B is followed by A → AB

T

F
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Appendix C: Pre-Test Questions
1) Drag the bar to indicate your chances of receiving [active] subliminal cues (this
information was provided earlier). (0-100%)
2) Drag the bar to indicate your chances of receiving [placebo (inactive)] subliminal cues
(this information was provided earlier). (0-100%)
3) How likely do you believe that the [active] subliminal cues will improve your
cognitive performance? (Extremely likely, Moderately likely, Slightly likely, Neither
likely nor unlikely, Slightly unlikely, Moderately unlikely, Extremely unlikely)
4) How strongly do you hope that the [active] subliminal cues will improve your
performance?
(Extremely, Moderately, Somewhat, Slightly, Not at all)
5) How likely do you believe that the [placebo (inactive)] subliminal cues will improve
your cognitive performance? (Extremely likely, Moderately likely, Slightly likely,
Neither likely nor unlikely, Slightly unlikely, Moderately unlikely, Extremely unlikely)
6) How strongly do you hope that the [placebo (inactive)] subliminal cues will improve
your performance? (Extremely, Moderately, Somewhat, Slightly, Not at all)
7) How likely do you believe that the [active] subliminal cues (if you receive them) will
improve your cognitive performance? (Extremely likely, Moderately likely, Slightly
likely, Neither likely nor unlikely, Slightly unlikely, Moderately unlikely, Extremely
unlikely)
8) How strongly do you hope that the [active] subliminal cues (if you receive them) will
improve your cognitive performance? (Extremely, Moderately, Somewhat, Slightly, Not
at all)
9) How likely do you believe that the [placebo (inactive)] subliminal cues (if you receive
them) will improve your cognitive performance? (Extremely likely, Moderately likely,
Slightly likely, Neither likely nor unlikely, Slightly unlikely, Moderately unlikely,
Extremely unlikely)
10) How strongly do you hope that the [placebo (inactive)] subliminal cues (if you
receive them) will improve your cognitive performance? (Extremely, Moderately,
Somewhat, Slightly, Not at all)
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Appendix D: Post-Test Questions
1) Of the questions that you answered, for how many were you confident about?
(All, Most, About Half, Some, None)
2) Drag the bar to indicate your chances of having received [active] subliminal cues (this
information was provided before the test): (0-100%)
2) Drag the bar to indicate your chances of having received [placebo (inactive)]
subliminal cues (this information was provided before the test): (0-100%)
3) Which group do you believe that you were assigned to? (Active, Placebo)
4) How confident are you that you were assigned to this group?
(Extrmely, Moderately, Somewhat, Slightly, Not at all)
5) Do you feel that the subliminal cues [active or placebo] you received improved your
performance? (Definitely, Probably, Maybe, Probably not, Definitely not)
6) How much do you feel that the subliminal cues [active or placebo] improved your
performance? (Substantial, Moderate, Some, A little, None)
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Appendix E: Demographic Questions
1. Are you bilingual/multilingual? (Yes, No)
2. Is English your native language? (Yes, No)
3. Gender: (Female, Male, Other)
4. Age: (Dropdown list)
5. Primary race/ethnicity: (Dropdown list)
6. Highest level of education completed: (Dropdown list)
7. Device used: (Dropdown list)
8. Primary input method used during the test: (Dropdown list)
9. Comments/Feedback:
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